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DISCOVERY AS REGULATION
Diego A. Zambrano*
This article develops an approach to discovery that is grounded in regulatory
theory and administrative subpoena power. The conventional judicial and
scholarly view about discovery is that it promotes fair and accurate outcomes
and nudges the parties toward settlement. While commonly held, however,
this belief is increasingly outdated and suffers from limitations. Among them,
it has generated endless controversy about the problem of discovery costs. Indeed, a growing chorus of scholars and courts has offered an avalanche of reforms, from cost shifting and bespoke discovery contracts to outright
elimination. Recently, Judge Thomas Hardiman quipped that if he had absolute power, he would abolish discovery for cases involving less than $500,000.
These debates, however, are at a standstill, and existing scholarship offers incomplete treatment of discovery theory that might move debates forward.
The core insight of the project is that in the private-enforcement context—
where Congress deliberately employs private litigants as the main method of
statutory enforcement—there is a surprisingly strong case that our current
discovery system should be understood in part as serving regulatory goals
analogous to administrative subpoena power. That is, discovery here can be
seen as an extension of the subpoena power that agencies like the SEC, FTC,
and EPA possess and is the lynchpin of a system that depends on private litigants to enforce our most important statutes. By forcing parties to disclose
large amounts of information, discovery deters harm and, most importantly,
shapes industry-wide practices and the primary behavior of regulated entities. This approach has a vast array of implications for the scope of discovery
as well as the debate over costs. Scholars and courts should thus grapple with
the consequences of what I call “regulatory discovery” for the entire legal system.
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INTRODUCTION
Discovery is the backbone of American litigation and sits at the center of
a constellation of procedural doctrines. It has shaped pleading standards,
qualified immunity, and summary judgment jurisprudence and, as a practi-
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cal matter, determines settlement negotiations, case outcomes, and the prevalence of trials. 1 Across a range of contexts, from civil rights to antitrust and
employment claims, discovery is often outcome determinative. Perhaps because of its centrality in the system, no single procedure generates more controversy. Critics cast discovery as unconstrained, burdensome, overly costly,
intrusive, and “nuts.” 2 Supporters, by contrast, argue that complaints about
discovery costs are empirically unproven and that discovery provides “public
benefits.” 3 A growing chorus of commentators from both camps and even
courts has offered an avalanche of reforms ranging from cost shifting and
bespoke discovery contracts to outright abolition. 4 But despite such offers,
existing scholarship on discovery theory, to the extent it might serve as a
guide to those reforms, is incomplete. Addressing discovery’s fundamental
underpinning is essential to any clear-eyed assessment of proposed changes.
The resulting challenge is apparent: How can we rationalize our discovery
system and the core purposes it serves?
This Article tackles the discovery morass with the goal of building a firm
theoretical footing for parts of the discovery system. My most basic aim is to
complement discovery’s traditional foundations in principles of fairness,
equality, and settlement with a reconceptualization that draws on regulatory
theory and administrative subpoena power. With a better understanding of
how discovery could and should work, I hope to then reassess our most important discovery doctrines and scholarly debates in a fuller and more helpful light. The Article thus undertakes the following two goals, among many
others:
First, it aspires to clarify the burdens of a current obsession with discovery costs—including the judicial creation of satellite doctrines that close access to court, like qualified immunity and higher pleading standards. While
the Supreme Court dodges deeper questions about discovery, it often focuses
on the back end of the system—its costs. This dearth of theory and constitutional analysis has atrophied discovery discourse. From the Supreme Court’s
decisions to raise pleading standards in Twombly and Iqbal, to the attempt to
protect police officers from time-consuming depositions, discovery costs
have become a justification for restrictive procedure. But tethering discovery
to other doctrines like pleading and qualified immunity is potentially desta-

1. John H. Langbein, The Disappearance of Civil Trial in the United States, 122 YALE
L.J. 522, 526 (2012).
2. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635, 637 (1989); Martin H. Redish & Colleen McNamara, Back to the Future: Discovery Cost Allocation and Modern
Procedural Theory, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 773, 774 (2011); Stephen N. Subrin, Discovery in
Global Perspective: Are We Nuts?, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 299, 300 (2002).
3. See Linda S. Mullenix, The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive Discovery Abuse: The Sequel,
39 B.C. L. REV. 683, 684–85 (1998). See generally STEPHEN B. BURBANK & SEAN FARHANG,
RIGHTS AND RETRENCHMENT: THE COUNTERREVOLUTION AGAINST FEDERAL LITIGATION
(2017).
4. See, e.g., Seth Katsuya Endo, Discovery Hydraulics, 52 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 1317
(2019); Richard L. Marcus, Discovery Containment Redux, 39 B.C. L. REV. 747 (1998).
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bilizing. It means that as Advisory Committee amendments or technological
changes like machine learning 5 potentially reduce discovery costs, discoverydependent doctrines should immediately adjust: Twombly and Iqbal would
be redundant; rules that encourage settlement unnecessary; qualified immunity obsolete; and even “rigorous” policing of class actions outdated. Although this cascading effect is logically necessary, courts are likely to ignore
the consequences and leave in place outdated doctrines.
Second, the Article offers a theoretical structure and new vocabulary to
move debates over discovery forward into new territory—that is to say, more
productive discussions that engage with the ultimate goals of the system and
whether the rules are serving those goals. When it comes to discovery, courts
often glide by underlying theories, embracing the simplified view that discovery can be justified because a full exchange of information results in a fair
and accurate resolution of a dispute, promotes the ends of equal justice, 6 and
ameliorates asymmetries between one-shot plaintiffs and repeat player defendants. 7 Moreover, by forcing the parties to reveal all their arguments and
evidence, discovery narrows issues for trial and nudges the parties toward
settlement. 8 But this fairness-accuracy-settlement mantra suffers from significant limitations because it overlooks the role that discovery plays in privateenforcement cases. Taking that role into account transforms the ultimate
goals of parts of the system and offers a dose of comfort: within the American private-enforcement scheme—one that relies on private litigants to enforce important statutes—our discovery rules make sense and offer an array
of benefits.
At the center of the Article is a theory of private discovery that addresses
these questions with a regulatory model grounded in administrative power. 9
5. See David Freeman Engstrom & Jonah B. Gelbach, Legal Tech, Civil Procedure, and
the Future of American Adversarialism, 169 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at
30–41) (on file with the Michigan Law Review).
6. See Wayne D. Brazil, The Adversary Character of Civil Discovery: A Critique and
Proposals for Change, 31 VAND. L. REV. 1295, 1302 (1978); infra notes 94–98 and accompanying text.
7. See Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 287 (2004); infra
notes 99–107 and accompanying text.
8. See Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, An Economic Model of Legal Discovery,
23 J. LEGAL STUD. 435, 436 (1994); Langbein, supra note 1, at 533; Stephen C. Yeazell, Getting
What We Asked For, Getting What We Paid For, and Not Liking What We Got: The Vanishing
Civil Trial, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 943, 950–54 (2004); infra notes 108–119 and accompanying text. The main drafter of the discovery rules, Edson Sunderland, argued that broad
discovery would be a boon because it would make trials unnecessary. Edson R. Sunderland,
Improving the Administration of Civil Justice, in 167 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 60,
75 (1933); see also Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The Historical Background
of the 1938 Federal Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691, 691, 697 (1998).
9. Some scholars have previously argued in favor of—but not fully explored—this justification. See, e.g., BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 3, at 70 (“Discovery under the 1938 Federal Rules conferred on private litigants and their attorneys the functional equivalent of
administrative subpoena power.” (footnote omitted)); Stephen B. Burbank, Proportionality and
the Social Benefits of Discovery: Out of Sight and Out of Mind?, 34 REV. LITIG. 647, 651–54

October 2020]

Discovery as Regulation

75

A long and rich literature has described how the United States depends
largely on private plaintiffs to enforce important statutes in contexts like
employment, environmental protection, antitrust, and civil rights. 10 In these
cases, private lawsuits become a regulatory tool and the legal system transforms from one where “one citizen can seek redress from another in an orderly fashion,” 11 into one where citizens or groups of citizens can enforce the
law for systemic regulatory purposes. 12 I extend this literature to argue that
in a lawsuit-as-regulation system, discovery is the lynchpin of private enforcement. By forcing parties to disclose large amounts of information, the
discovery system deters harmful behavior, structures the regularized production of information within corporations, and, most importantly, shapes the
primary behavior of regulated entities. 13 Discovery therefore serves an im(2015) (noting the agency subpoena’s strength as a regulatory tool and arguing that to ensure
“proportionality [does not] become a deregulatory tool . . . judges must resist the temptation to
privilege . . . private over public interests” in discovery rulings); Paul D. Carrington, Renovating Discovery, 49 ALA. L. REV. 51, 54 (1997) (“Private litigants do in America much of what is
done in other industrial states by public officers working within an administrative bureaucracy.”); Patrick Higginbotham, Foreword, 49 ALA. L. REV. 1, 4–5 (1997) (“Calibration of discovery is calibration of the level of enforcement of the social policy set by Congress.”). However,
this theory and its many implications have not been fully developed.
10. See infra notes 123–129 and accompanying text; see also ROBERT A. KAGAN,
ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 10 (2nd ed. 2019) (emphasizing litigant
participation as central to the “American way of law”); Nora Freeman Engstrom, When Cars
Crash: The Automobile’s Tort Law Legacy, 53 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 293, 305–08 (2018) (discussing the “much larger regulatory fabric,” enforced by private causes of action, around auto
claims); J. Maria Glover, The Structural Role of Private Enforcement Mechanisms in Public Law,
53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1137, 1141 (2012) (arguing that private enforcement mechanisms are
“often an institutional feature of our public law”).
11. Jack H. Friedenthal, Secrecy in Civil Litigation: Discovery and Party Agreements, 9
J.L. & POL’Y 67, 69 (2000).
12. This is, of course, a contested view rejected by eminent scholars. For example, Martin Redish challenges the legitimacy of such a view and argues that litigation cannot have a
regulatory role, especially through procedural vehicles like class actions, without violating the
Rules Enabling Act. See, e.g., MARTIN H. REDISH, WHOLESALE JUSTICE: CONSTITUTIONAL
DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF THE CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT (2009). I set these debates
aside here.
13. Among others, I draw on three literatures that have produced related insights: First,
research finding that discovery can unearth otherwise-hidden information on corporate misconduct and lead to internal corporate reforms. See, e.g., Érica Gorga & Michael Halberstam,
Litigation Discovery and Corporate Governance: The Missing Story About the “Genius of American Corporate Law,” 63 EMORY L.J. 1383 (2014) (arguing that discovery has shaped corporate
law); Joanna C. Schwartz, Introspection Through Litigation, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1055
(2015) [hereinafter Schwartz, Introspection Through Litigation] (arguing that litigation allows
companies to engage in “introspection” about internal behavior that would otherwise go unrecognized). Scholars have studied this phenomenon in several areas, including medical malpractice, see TOM BAKER, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYTH (2005); Joanna C. Schwartz, A
Dose of Reality for Medical Malpractice Reform, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1224 (2013) [hereinafter
Schwartz, A Dose of Reality]; gun litigation, see Timothy D. Lytton, Using Tort Litigation to
Enhance Regulatory Policy Making: Evaluating Climate-Change Litigation in Light of Lessons
from Gun-Industry and Clergy-Sexual-Abuse Lawsuits, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1837 (2008); Wendy
Wagner, When All Else Fails: Regulating Risky Products Through Tort Litigation, 95 GEO. L.J.
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portant purpose in a legal system that relies on private litigants to enforce
the law.
While this view of discovery-as-regulation has been discussed by some
scholars, the Article at its core pushes the theory forward and fully develops
it by focusing on the analogy to administrative subpoena power. 14 That power is the absolute “backbone of an administrative agency’s effectiveness,” because it gives agencies “the ability to investigate rapidly the activities of
entities within the agency’s jurisdiction.” 15 Agencies can issue ex parte subpoenas for vast amounts of regulated entities’ information. 16 The SEC, for
example, routinely requests burdensome productions of financial documents. 17 The FTC demands thousands of pages related to any potential merger. The EPA, too, makes regular inquiries into environmental polluters.
Civil discovery’s broad scope is partly an extension of this power. Congress
enacted a wide variety of broad statutes and has delegated enforcement to
private plaintiffs rather than agencies. 18 In order for these statutes to succeed, just as the FTC, EPA, and SEC possess subpoena powers, so too do
plaintiffs need powerful discovery tools. Beyond individual cases, discovery
promotes regulatory goals by influencing how companies run internal investigations, how management structures operations, and how regulators formulate new rules. 19 To be sure, plaintiffs lack the democratic and public
legitimacy of agency officials, so their private tools cannot, and do not, fully
693 (2007); clergy-sexual-abuse litigation, see Lytton, supra; and breast-implant litigation, see
Wagner supra.
Second, the long line of works that describe litigation more generally as a form of regulation. See, e.g., SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND PRIVATE
LAWSUITS IN THE U.S. 60, 64–65 (2010); Pamela H. Bucy, Private Justice, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1
(2002); Glover, supra note 10; Schwartz, Introspection Through Litigation, supra; Michael
Selmi, Public vs. Private Enforcement of Civil Rights: The Case of Housing and Employment, 45
UCLA L. REV. 1401 (1998); Matthew C. Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement:
The Case for Expanding the Role of Administrative Agencies, 91 VA. L. REV. 93 (2005).
Finally, work in the intersection of torts and civil procedure that focuses on litigation’s
public benefits in a variety of tort-related contexts. See Engstrom, supra note 10, at 328–35 (auto); Robert L. Rabin, Poking Holes in the Fabric of Tort: A Comment, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 293,
302 (2007) (asbestos, tobacco, and medical instruments). See generally ALEXANDRA LAHAV, IN
PRAISE OF LITIGATION (2017).
14. Steve Burbank and Sean Farhang have previously noted this resemblance. BURBANK
& FARHANG, supra note 3, at 70 (“Discovery under the 1938 Federal Rules conferred on private
litigants and their attorneys the functional equivalent of administrative subpoena power.” (citations omitted)); Burbank, supra note 9, at 651–54. But the analogy remains underexplored,
and this Article is the first to undertake a comprehensive comparison between private discovery and administrative subpoena power.
15. Jack W. Campbell IV, Revoking the “Fishing License:” Recent Decisions Place Unwarranted Restrictions on Administrative Agencies’ Power to Subpoena Personal Financial Records,
49 VAND. L. REV. 395, 396 (1996) (footnote omitted).
16. See infra Section III.B.1.
17. See infra note 182 and accompanying text.
18. See generally FARHANG, supra note 13.
19. See Gorga & Halberstam, supra note 13, at 1453–54.
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mirror agency power. But I argue extensively that, for many reasons—
including the distorted incentives of public enforcers and the fact that Congress’s choice to arm private plaintiffs with this discovery power confers a
measure of democratic legitimacy in itself—this difference does not weaken
the legitimacy or effect of regulatory discovery.
Conceptualizing discovery as a regulatory tool should transform our
current understanding of litigation as regulation—and also changes the
problem of discovery costs into a comparative question. Whether discovery
costs are too high should depend less on a case’s amount in controversy and
more on whether the case generates proportional regulatory benefits and
fewer costs than a comparable agency investigation. In discovery disputes,
courts and litigants should explicitly consider this comparison. This is not to
say that agency costs are optimal, but only that an agency investigation is the
conceptual alternative to private enforcement and is therefore a good point
of reference. Costs, in this sense, have little to do with the individual interests
of litigants. They instead must take into account the systemic benefits of enforcing a statute in a context where Congress chose private plaintiffs to investigate wrongdoing. Thus, complaints about discovery costs must grapple
with the burdens of agency subpoena powers in the first place. Discovery is
an alternative to—and an outsourced version of—administrative regulation.
The bulk of the Article discusses the intricacies of regulatory discovery,
but a brief example demonstrates its implications. In a 2005 case against
Disney, plaintiff-shareholders claimed that the company had corruptly
awarded $140 million dollars to an outgoing executive. 20 Discovery in the
case was substantial: 9,000 pages of transcripts, extensive business records,
and detailed private correspondence. Under a traditional understanding of
discovery—the fairness-accuracy-settlement view—all of this information
exchange was a waste because the court ultimately found (at trial) that Disney was not liable. 21 But take a regulatory and systemic view and things look
very different. Disney’s board, along with a series of competitors and peers,
completely reformed their governance structures based on documents produced in discovery. 22 This extensive information also allowed the court to
“articulate[] new standards of fiduciary duty,” gave lawyers new tools “to get
their clients to accept better conduct and procedures,” and even informed
new SEC regulations. 23 Discovery, in other words, regulated system-wide
corporate behavior.
With this discovery theory in view, the Article then offers a few primary
contributions. To begin, whereas discovery scholarship focuses on individual
issues, such as costs or the language of Rule 26, this Article is the first to tie
background justifications together into a single theoretical framework—one

20. Id. at 1401; see also In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch.
2005), aff’d, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).
21. See Gorga & Halberstam, supra note 13, at 1402.
22. Id. at 1403.
23. Id. at 1427 (citations omitted).
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that can inform each court’s discovery analysis. This discussion of theory
highlights discovery’s relationship to values like accuracy, regulation, and
fairness. This also allows the Article to make a normative case for how courts
should carry out discovery inquiries. Discovery is a plural device with multiple justifications and both individual and systemic implications. For example, whereas fairness and equality theories sound in individual rights,
regulatory discovery, by contrast, is only systemic. So in private-enforcement
cases, courts should err on the side of broad discovery by interpreting “proportionality” in relation not only to the needs of the specific case but also to
the needs of the relevant statutory regime and industry. Moreover, the
breadth of discovery should be related to whether the statutory regime depends largely, somewhat, or only scarcely, on private enforcement. The more
a regime depends on private enforcement, the broader discovery should be,
and vice versa. The Article otherwise adds to an emerging literature on the
fruitful interaction between administrative law and civil procedure. 24
Additionally, the Article develops a better vocabulary for describing regulatory discovery’s implications, so that public discussions can be better informed. Just in the past year, arguments about discovery have gone
mainstream. Judges Hardiman and Thapar recently proposed to abolish discovery for cases “worth less than $500,000.” 25 Judge Hardiman lamented the
loss of jury trials, too. But these critiques overlook many of discovery’s core
purposes. With an institutional view in mind, it’s clear that discovery can
limit trials in order to save costs and avoid the burden of impaneling a jury.
Similarly, under regulatory discovery, the amount in controversy may be irrelevant—what matters more is whether a plaintiff is enforcing a statute that
depends on private claims. Cases worth less than $500,000 can nonetheless
have significant positive spillovers on the law and regulated industries by
spurring deterrence, corporate reforms, and better regulation by agencies. 26
For instance, documents and depositions in the seminal sexual harassment
case Faragher v. City of Boca Raton 27—with an amount in controversy below
$500,000—became the basis for widespread reforms to sexual harassment
policies and personnel practices. Besides, agencies routinely issue subpoenas
24. See, e.g., David Freeman Engstrom, Agencies as Litigation Gatekeepers, 123 YALE L.J.
616 (2013); Lumen N. Mulligan & Glen Staszewski, The Supreme Court’s Regulation of Civil
Procedure: Lessons from Administrative Law, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1188 (2012); David L. Noll,
MDL as Public Administration, 118 MICH. L. REV. 403 (2019); Michael Sant’Ambrogio & Adam S. Zimmerman, Inside the Agency Class Action, 126 YALE L.J. 1634 (2017).
25. Debra Cassens Weiss, Judge on Trump’s Supreme Court Short List Proposes Discovery
Ban for Cases Worth Less than $500K, A.B.A J. (Dec. 10, 2018, 8:15 AM),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/judge_on_trumps_supreme_court_shortlist_propose
s_discovery_ban_for_cases_wo [https://perma.cc/4XJ6-N8FH].
26. Cf. Stephen B. Burbank & Stephen N. Subrin, Litigation and Democracy: Restoring a
Realistic Prospect of Trial, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 399, 409, 411 (2011) (proposing categorical restrictions on discovery “for ‘simple’ cases”—defined by amount in controversy—but excluding private enforcement cases, where “broader discovery . . . may be necessary for adequate
enforcement”).
27. 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
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in cases worth less than $500,000, and private discovery may otherwise be
much less burdensome than a thorough investigation by, say, the SEC or the
EEOC.
Before proceeding, a word about the Article’s limitations is in order.
Although the Article explores the regulatory theory of discovery, it does not
argue that the current amount or breadth of discovery is systemically optimal. There may be areas where waste needs cutting back and others where
broader discovery is needed. Nor does the Article argue that ex post regulation via litigation is preferable to ex ante regulation via the administrative
state. It necessarily sets this question—along with associated empirical questions—to the side. Relatedly, the Article relies on important examples like
the Disney, Argentina, and Faragher cases, where discovery was beneficial,
but does not claim that regulatory discovery is always beneficial. Indeed, in
the analogous agency context, critics of the administrative state have long
complained about protracted and wasteful agency investigations that serve
only to justify the initial decision to initiate an investigation. The Article’s
claim is only that discovery serves regulatory purposes comparable to administrative subpoena power, for better or worse.
As a final limitation, the Article makes a claim about regulatory discovery in the context of private-enforcement statutes that may be distinct from
common law or tort claims. While discovery surely can serve as regulation in
mass torts, the analytic framework and its underlying legitimacy are somewhat different. Private enforcement derives legitimacy from Congress’s deliberate choice to empower private plaintiffs either to complement or replace
administrative agencies. 28 This choice is why private discovery in those
claims is analogous to administrative subpoenas. Tort claims, by contrast,
rely on a long common law tradition based mostly on state law. Discovery in
that context must therefore be grounded in a different theory that may or
may not support an analogy to agency subpoena power. Nonetheless, discovery in mass torts cases produces similar effects, so it may be illustrative of
regulatory discovery. For that and other reasons, the Article uses examples
from the tort context but leaves the necessary theory building to future research.
The discussion that follows proceeds in four Parts. Part I frames the
problem of discovery costs and the Supreme Court’s turn to doctrine to solve
it. This Part situates the project within existing discovery scholarship and
sketches the framework around which discovery theory must operate. That
theory is then developed in Part II, with the three traditional theories of fairness, equality, and trial narrowing. Part III—the heart of the article—
introduces an approach to discovery based on regulation. Finally, Part IV
pulls these threads together to provide a novel way to address discovery disputes.

28. FARHANG, supra note 13, at 64 (“[L]egislators deploy private litigants and plaintiffs’
attorneys as a source of state capacity . . . contemplat[ing] a high degree of intentionality.”).
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IDENTIFYING THE PROBLEM: DISCOVERY-COSTS DISPUTES

For better or worse, discovery is the central and often outcomedeterminative procedure in American litigation. 29 It has a long history rooted in equity, where flexibility was paramount. 30 Away from the danger of
common law juries, equity judges developed procedures that allowed parties
to engage in a protracted process of producing information from and to each
other. Whether through depositions or broad document requests that extended even to third parties, equity saw discovery as the definitive device for
setting the tables of a judicial decision. By contrast, the common law world
emphasized pleadings and trials as the information flushing events to decide
a case.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure’s drafters combined common law
and equity discovery procedures into one whole, and the system later
evolved into the modern Rules 26–37, which allow parties to obtain broad
information on the central facts of a case before trial. One defining feature of
the current system—amended several times post-1938—is that discovery is
“extremely broad,” 31 allowing parties to obtain information “regarding any
matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the
action, whether or not the information sought will be admissible at trial.” 32
The main drafter of the discovery rules, Edson Sunderland, argued that
“[t]he new federal rules . . . authoriz[e] the parties themselves to employ an
almost unlimited discovery.” 33 The rules seek a comprehensive exchange of
information led by the parties. That is why the rules authorize initial disclosures (a recent development adopted in the 1990s), subpoenas, depositions,
interrogatories, physical examinations, property inspections, requests for
admissions, and even an iterative process where parties can engage in new
information requests based on old requests. All of this leads to a far-reaching
release of information related to the case and claims.

29. Nora Freeman Engstrom, The Lessons of Lone Pine, 129 YALE L.J. 2, 67 (2019) (“By
the late 1980s . . . [i]t was discovery, not trial—the deposition, not the cross-examination—that
became the focal point of American civil litigation.”); Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to
Judgment: Are the “Litigation Explosion,” “Liability Crisis,” and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our
Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 1076 (2003); Stephen C.
Yeazell, Essay, The Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil Process, 1994 WIS. L. REV.
631, 637–39 (noting that discovery disputes are often dispositive to litigation outcomes). For
purposes of this paper, I am referring almost entirely to pretrial discovery. I set aside the quite
different world of post-judgment discovery. See generally Aaron D. Simowitz, Transnational
Enforcement Discovery, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 3293 (2015).
30. Amalia D. Kessler, Our Inquisitorial Tradition: Equity Procedure, Due Process, and
the Search for an Alternative to the Adversarial, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1181 (2005).
31. United States v. Leggett & Platt, Inc., 542 F.2d 655, 657 (6th Cir. 1976) (citations
omitted).
32. JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, MARY KAY KANE & ARTHUR R. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE
§ 7.2 (2d ed. 1993) (citing the pre-2015 discovery language that has been amended).
33. Edson R. Sunderland, Discovery Before Trial Under the New Federal Rules, 15 TENN.
L. REV. 737, 738 (1939).
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It is difficult to overstate the uniquely American nature of this information disclosure system. Discovery has become an integral part of the
American concept of due process—so much so that some argue discovery is
of constitutional foundation. 34 Other countries, however, consider it anathema. In common law countries, discovery can sometimes include broad
document productions and mandatory disclosures, but it is typically limited
by “specific pleading, the short time limit imposed for document production,
and the definition of the obligation to produce.” 35 The combination of these
factors results in a “considerably narrower” exchange of information vis-àvis the United States. 36 In civil law countries, there is no broad exchange of
documents or disclosures, and the process is wholly supervised by a judge
who makes it her goal to keep the case constrained and focused. 37 These inquisitorial systems give parties very little power to engage in wide-ranging
information requests, and they prohibit depositions. 38 Differences between
our broad discovery system and the narrow approach prevalent in every other country have thus provoked significant foreign critiques. 39
Setting foreign comparisons aside, to speak of broad discovery as a homogeneous coherent procedure is misleading because there is no single process that is invariant from case to case. There are large complex litigation
cases—a diverse set in itself that often involves mass torts and statutoryenforcement cases—where discovery can take up years and produce millions
of records and dozens of depositions. But these are a small minority of all
cases in the federal docket. In the run-of-the-mill case, litigants “employ[] no
discovery at all, and a ‘substantial percentage’ of the [federal] docket employ[s] very little.” 40 Cases often settle immediately or in the early stages of
discovery. Other cases need no discovery, and summary judgment is sufficient with only a few documents at hand. Yet other cases need only documentary discovery and no depositions at all. To understand discovery, we
have to understand its inherent pluralism and case-dependent nature. Below,
I address (a) scholarly and judicial debates about discovery costs, (b) the judicial development of doctrines meant to control discovery, and (c) that development’s problematic consequences.

34. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., From Whom No Secrets Are Hid, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1665, 1694
(1998); Subrin, supra note 2.
35. Hazard, supra note 34, at 1681.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1682.
38. See Kessler, supra note 30, at 1261 (discussing French civil procedure, among others).
39. Diego Zambrano, A Comity of Errors: The Rise, Fall, and Return of International
Comity in Transnational Discovery, 44 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 157, 170–71 (2016).
40. Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 62 (2010).
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A. The Discovery Costs Debates
Despite this pluralism, complex cases with extensive discovery have long
shaped struggles over the role of discovery in public-law litigation and its attendant costs. Indeed, despite discovery’s rich heritage, debates for the past
four decades have been bogged down almost entirely on the question of
costs. 41 After the emergence of class actions and the public-law bar in the late
1960s, litigation became embroiled in a battle between corporate defendants
and newly empowered plaintiffs’ attorneys. In these litigation wars, corporate defendants launched attacks against any procedures that empowered
plaintiffs’ attorneys, including not just class actions but also private rights of
actions. 42 Discovery, too, became entangled in this struggle over the role of
litigation in the enforcement of public-law statutes.
Recently, scholarly articles about discovery have mostly focused on the
problem of costs. 43 As Seth Endo has summarized, an avalanche of discovery
reform proposals all focus on solving the alleged cost problem, including:
limits to the amount of discovery in all cases, a proportionality requirement,
linking requests to the amount in controversy, mandatory stays pending a
motion to dismiss, information sampling, dividing the process into phases,
empowering judges (and availability of sanctions), ADR, expanding the use
of bespoke discovery contracts, predictive coding and other machine learning, cost-shifting, quantum meruit cost recovery, and others. 44
All of these scholarly proposals draw from a four-decade-long debate
about the appropriate scope of discovery. Beginning with the 1976 Pound
Conference on civil procedure, “proposals for amendment to the rules have
generally involved retreats from the broadest concept of discovery.” 45 The
Pound Conference prompted the creation of a variety of working groups and
conferences with the sole goal of controlling discovery costs. 46 The Carter
Administration followed these efforts with a directive to a new antitrust
commission, asking for a “revision of discovery practices in order to limit
expensive and time-consuming inquiry into areas not germane to contested
issues.” 47 These efforts, and others, built substantial momentum for discov-

41. Brooke D. Coleman, One Percent Procedure, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1005, 1060–61
(2016); Endo, Discovery Hydraulics, supra note 4, at 1343–44; Danya Shocair Reda, The Costand-Delay Narrative in Civil Justice Reform: Its Fallacies and Functions, 90 OR. L. REV. 1085,
1123–24 (2012).
42. See BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 3, at 15–16, 26, 141–43.
43. Jay Tidmarsh, Opting Out of Discovery, 71 VAND. L. REV. 1801, 1813 (2018)
(“[M]uch of the energy in U.S. procedural reform for the past thirty-five years has been directed toward solving the cost problem in discovery.”).
44. Endo, supra note 4, at 1343–68; see also Jessica Erickson, Bespoke Discovery, 71
VAND. L. REV. 1873, 1876 (2018); Engstrom & Gelbach, supra note 5, at 38–41.
45. Marcus, supra note 4, at 747.
46. Id. at 752–53.
47. Id. at 753 (quoting Exec. Order No. 12,022, 42 Fed. Reg. 61,441 § 2(1)(iii) (Dec. 5,
1977)).

October 2020]

Discovery as Regulation

83

ery reform that spread like a contagion and led to recurrent amendments to
the rules. 48
Since the turn of the century, discovery costs debates have been reshaped by the emergence of electronically stored information. 49 Modern
technologies have expanded the generation of information within corporations and regulated entities. This expansion has transformed discovery into a
much more complicated process where “traditional practices” have been unable to “keep up with the explosion of the universe of discoverable material.” 50 Advisory Committee debates have responded to ESI with renewed
proposals to address the problem of discovery costs. All told, the Committee
has changed the discovery rules over a dozen times between 1980 and 2015. 51
Whether discovery costs are an actual problem—or just a proxy fight
over the role of litigation in society—depends on how one slices up the federal docket. 52 Of course, abusive discovery exists, and discovery does impose
significant costs in some cases. 53 But the extent of “[t]he costs may be somewhat overstated—or partially self-inflicted—and certainly they are not universally imposed across the litigation universe.” 54 Most empirical discovery
studies consist of attorney or judicial surveys and very few peer into actual
case data. 55 But a review of existing studies of federal litigation produces a
few common conclusions:

48. See generally BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 3; Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Rulemaking and the Counterrevolution Against Federal Litigation: Discovery, in POUND
CIV. JUST. INST., WHO WILL WRITE YOUR RULES: YOUR STATES COURT OR THE FEDERAL
JUDICIARY? 24TH ANNUAL FORUM FOR STATE APPELLATE COURT JUDGES (2017),
http://www.poundinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/2016-forum-report-1.9.18.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XV24-7YM3].
49. See Endo, supra note 4, 1319–20.
50. Id. at 1320.
51. Id. at 1327–28; Stephen B. Burbank, Sean Farhang & Herbert M. Kritzer, Private
Enforcement, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 637, 657 & n.79 (2013).
52. As Danya Reda has discussed, concerns about discovery costs have never really
matched actual empirical data showing that the system is not overly costly. Reda, supra note
41, at 1122–23. Here, I draw on Reda’s ideas in the specific context of discovery.
53. See Joshua M. Koppel, Comment, Tailoring Discovery: Using Nontranssubstantive
Rules to Reduce Waste and Abuse, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 243, 254 (2012).
54. Id. at 252 n.52 (quoting Miller, supra note 40, at 62).
55. See, e.g., FLEMING JAMES, JR., GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & JOHN LEUBSDORF, CIVIL
PROCEDURE § 5.2, at 288 n.7 (5th ed. 2001); EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED.
JUD. CTR., PRELIMINARY REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON
CIVIL RULES (2009); THOMAS E. WILLGING, JOHN SHAPARD, DONNA STIENSTRA & DEAN
MILETICH, FED. JUD. CTR., DISCOVERY AND DISCLOSURE PRACTICE, PROBLEMS, AND
PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE: A CASE-BASED NATIONAL SURVEY OF COUNSEL IN CLOSED FEDERAL
CIVIL CASES 1–2, 4, 8, 14–16 tbls.3, 4 & 5 (1997); Judith A. McKenna & Elizabeth C. Wiggins,
Empirical Research on Civil Discovery, 39 B.C. L. REV. 785, 790–92 (1998); Mullenix, supra note
3, at 684–85; Reda, supra note 41, at 1123–24.
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•

Most civil cases (>50%) involve no discovery or very limited discovery; 56

•

Cases with discovery typically implicate costs that are proportional to the total stakes (median of discovery costs is 3.3% of the
amount in controversy for defendants); 57

•

The median litigation costs (including discovery and attorneys’
fees) for defendants is $20,000; 58

•

High discovery costs are rare (less than 5% of cases); 59

•

In cases with “high” discovery costs, expenditures may account
for 32% or more of the amount in controversy; 60

•

Cases with voluminous discovery often involve complex litigation; 61

•

Lawyers perceive that e-discovery has increased costs; 62

•

Despite little empirical support, many judges 63 and lawyers 64 perceive discovery abuse as a significant problem.

56. See, e.g., PAUL CONNOLLY, EDITH A. HOLLEMAN & MICHAEL J. KUHLMAN, FED. JUD.
CTR., JUDICIAL CONTROLS AND THE CIVIL LITIGATION PROCESS: DISCOVERY 28 (1978); JOSEPH
L. EBERSOLE & BARLOW BURKE, FED. JUD. CTR., DISCOVERY PROBLEMS IN CIVIL CASES 5
(1980); JAMES S. KAKALIK, DEBORAH R. HENSLER, DANIEL MCCAFFREY, MARIAN OSHIRO,
NICHOLAS M. PAGE & MARY E. VAIANA, RAND INST. FOR CIV. JUST., DISCOVERY
MANAGEMENT: FURTHER ANALYSIS OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT EVALUATION DATA, at
xx (1998); David M. Trubek, Austin Sarat, William L.F. Felstiner, Herbert M. Kritze & Joel B.
Grossman, The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REV. 72, 89–90 (1983).
57. LEE & WILLGING, supra note 55, at 2; Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, Defining the Problem of Cost in Federal Civil Litigation, 60 DUKE L.J. 765, 770 (2010); Reda, supra
note 41, at 1089.
58. LEE & WILLGING, supra note 55, at 2.
59. McKenna & Wiggins, supra note 55, at 791.
60. Thomas E. Willging, Donna Stienstra, John Shapard & Dean Miletich, An Empirical
Study of Discovery and Disclosure Practice Under the 1993 Federal Rule Amendments, 39 B.C. L.
REV. 525, 531 (1998).
61. See EBERSOLE & BURKE, supra note 56. This Federal Judicial Center study doesn’t
define complex litigation itself, but it refers to the MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION
(FOURTH) (2004), which notes that “the term ‘complex litigation’ [is not] susceptible to any
bright-line definition,” although it clearly includes both private enforcement and mass tort
litigation. Id. at 1, 3.
62. AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWS., FINAL REPORT ON THE JOINT PROJECT OF THE
AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY AND THE INSTITUTE FOR
THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 16 (2009).
63. BROOKINGS INST., JUSTICE FOR ALL: REDUCING COSTS AND DELAY IN CIVIL
LITIGATION 7 (1989); C. RONALD ELLINGTON, A STUDY OF SANCTIONS FOR DISCOVERY ABUSE
(1979).
64. CIV. JUST. REFORM GRP., LAWS. FOR CIV. JUST., LITIGATION COST SURVEY OF MAJOR
COMPANIES 15–16 (2010); LITIG. SECTION, AM. BAR ASS’N, MEMBER SURVEY ON CIVIL
PRACTICE: DETAILED REPORT 2 (2009); LOUIS HARRIS & ASSOCS., INC., PROJECT NO. 881023,
PROCEDURAL REFORM OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM 20 (1989).
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The available evidence seems to show that “the federal civil system is
highly effective in most cases, that total costs develop in line with stakes, and
that discovery volume and cost is proportional to the amount at stake.” 65
Costs remain an issue in a minority of complex litigation cases that account
for the discovery costs contagion.
B. Discovery Avoidance
For decades, the Supreme Court and lower courts have actively participated in and shaped discovery-costs debates. In many cases, courts have used
discovery as a cudgel to shape nearly every facet of the modern civillitigation system, including in some of the most important procedural and
substantive cases. Courts have developed two tracks in their attempts to fight
discovery. At first, courts and the Advisory Committee focused on the idea
of judicial management of the discovery process. 66 But more recently, courts
have engaged in a systematic attempt to control discovery costs by raising
prediscovery barriers, including pleading standards, qualified immunity, and
arbitration. I term these efforts “discovery avoidance.” This has led to the
proliferation of doctrines parasitic to discovery across the litigation landscape.
Take, for example, the recently restated foundations of qualified immunity doctrine. The Court has repeatedly imputed to qualified immunity a
prophylactic role against the burden of discovery costs on police officers. As
recently detailed by Joanna Schwartz, the Court has “focused increasingly
on . . . the need to protect government officials from nonfinancial burdens
associated with discovery and trial. This desire has arguably shaped qualified
immunity more than any other policy justification for the doctrine.” 67 The
doctrine has progressively incorporated discovery costs as a larger concern.
In the seminal case Harlow v. Fitzgerald, the Court justified qualified immunity as a bulwark against “the expenses of litigation, the diversion of official energy from pressing public issues, and the deterrence of able citizens
from acceptance of public office,” as well as the possibility that lawsuits
would affect officials’ discharge of their duties. 68 As a second-order concern,
the Court also warned of the danger of “broad-ranging discovery and the
deposing of numerous persons, including an official’s professional colleagues.” 69 Only three years later, the Court emphasized the danger of dis-

65. Reda, supra note 41, at 1089.
66. Miller, supra note 40, at 54; Terence Dunworth & James S. Kakalik, Preliminary Observations on Implementation of the Pilot Program of the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 46
STAN. L. REV. 1303 (1994).
67. Joanna C. Schwartz, How Qualified Immunity Fails, 127 YALE L.J. 2, 9 (2017); see
also Joanna C. Schwartz, Civil Rights Ecosystems, 118 MICH. L. REV. 1539 (2020) (discussing
qualified immunity among the legal rules and remedies that define “civil rights ecosystems”—
collections of interconnected and interactive legal actors).
68. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982).
69. Id. at 817.
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covery to “be avoided if possible” 70 but still focused on its other justifications. By contrast, in the recent Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the Court claimed that
“[t]he basic thrust of the qualified-immunity doctrine is to free officials from
the concerns of litigation, including ‘avoidance of disruptive discovery.’ ” 71
This evolution shows discovery’s newfound role in qualified immunity. Another example of this kind of marriage between discovery and other procedures is found in the securities litigation context. Specifically, one of the
bluntest and most significant discovery-filtering mechanisms is the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA). 72 That statute contains a package
of reforms intended to diminish the power of plaintiffs’ attorneys in securities litigation, especially by weakening pretrial discovery. The House Report
is littered with references to the danger of discovery costs: “[T]he abuse of
the discovery process to impose costs [is] so burdensome that it is often economical for the victimized party to settle”; “The cost of discovery often forces innocent parties to settle frivolous securities class actions,”; “The House
and Senate heard testimony that discovery in securities class actions often
resembles a fishing expedition.” 73 Accordingly, the statute raises pleading
standards for securities claims and obligates courts to issue a discovery stay
while a motion to dismiss is pending. The Supreme Court noted about these
congressional changes to pleading that “[t]he basic purpose of the heightened pleading requirement . . . is to protect defendants from the costs of discovery and trial in unmeritorious cases.” 74 Again, through both of these
means, discovery is completely avoided.
Qualified immunity and the PSLRA are only two of a constellation of
similar changes intended to blunt discovery, including in the contexts of
pleading, class actions, Lone Pine orders, and arbitration. A very similar kind
of logic has been at work in the Supreme Court’s pleading jurisprudence. As
is by now widely known, the Supreme Court heightened pleading standards
in Twombly and Iqbal, largely because of a concern over discovery costs. The
Court embraced the implicit theory that pleading should serve as a filter that
reserves discovery for cases that can meet an initial threshold. 75 In the class-

70. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985).
71. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 685 (2009) (quoting Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226,
236 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment)).
72. See Gorga & Halberstam, supra note 13, at 1392–93; Hillary A. Sale, Heightened
Pleading and Discovery Stays: An Analysis of the Effect of the PSLRA’s Internal-Information
Standard on ’33 and ’34 Act Claims, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 537, 552–53 (1998).
73. H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31, 37 (1995) (Conf. Rep.); see also Gorga & Halberstam,
supra note 13, at 1392 (“The costs and abuses of discovery were . . . a key focus of the debates
concerning the . . . (PSLRA).”).
74. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rts., Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 335–36 (2007) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
75. See, e.g., Jonah B. Gelbach, Locking the Doors to Discovery? Assessing the Effects of
Twombly and Iqbal on Access to Discovery, 121 YALE L.J. 2270, 2285 (2012); J. Scott Pritchard,
Comment, The Hidden Costs of Pleading Plausibility: Examining the Impact of Twombly and
Iqbal on Employment Discrimination Complaints and the EEOC’s Litigation and Mediation Ef-
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actions world, federal courts developed the idea of a “rigorous review” of
certification motions in the 1990s partly because certification was perceived
as opening the door to crippling discovery costs. Along the same lines, courts
began to enforce the Federal Arbitration Act aggressively, allowing defendants to opt out of the litigation system entirely. 76 In an arbitration world divorced from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, discovery avoidance
became paramount. In yet another context, courts faced with mass tort
claims have developed “Lone Pine” orders, requiring plaintiffs to supply evidence of injury, exposure, and causation under penalty of dismissal—
sometimes before discovery. This can be seen as yet another example of discovery avoidance. 77 In these cases, policing class claims before they are certified, requiring more evidence early on, and forcing plaintiffs into arbitration
became ways to avoid discovery.
Setting these examples aside, we may worry that discovery concerns are
merely window dressing in these cases—in what is more likely a struggle
over the role of litigation in society. Although that is likely true for many
judges, there are also reasons to believe judicial concerns about discovery are
real. Decades of survey work have found that a significant percentage of federal judges voice strong concerns about discovery as “unnecessary,” “expensive,” and overly “burdensome.” 78 This apparent judicial attitude correlates
with over a dozen initiatives to address discovery costs: from Justice Burger’s
Pound Conference on litigation costs in 1976, to the 1990s disclosure
amendments, all the way to the 2015 proportionality amendments to the
rules. Moreover, this judicial perception of discovery does not seem to be an
entirely partisan phenomenon. Twombly’s attack on discovery costs was authored by the centrist Justice Souter in a 7–2 decision (although Iqbal was 5–
4); discovery reforms have mostly been the product of judicial consensus;
and the judiciary has otherwise attempted to control discovery through
amendments to the rules. 79 This indicates that perhaps concerns in this context are genuine. But even if some of the concerns about discovery are sincere, the way judges have operationalized those concerns has created
downstream harms that may be disproportionate to the problem.
C. The Problem with an Obsession over Costs
The combined developments of rule amendments and discovery avoidance and management, as well as the nearly complete domination of scholarforts, 83 TEMP. L. REV. 757, 780, 780 n.211 (2011); Suja A. Thomas, The New Summary Judgment Motion: The Motion to Dismiss under Iqbal and Twombly, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 15,
25 (2010).
76. J. Maria Glover, Disappearing Claims and the Erosion of Substantive Law, 124 YALE
L.J. 3052, 3054 (2015).
77. See Engstrom, supra note 29.
78. See ELLINGTON, supra note 63; supra notes 54–64.
79. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544
(2007).
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ly debates by costs, have imposed procedural hurdles that stand in the way of
a plaintiff’s day in court and have disfigured case law and rulemaking. 80
There are a flurry of problems with the changes spurred by the discoverycosts rhetoric, including the following three:
First, creating or reinforcing doctrines tethered to discovery runs the destabilizing risk of tying slow-moving legal principles to a quickly moving
target. Legal devices like pleading standards, qualified immunity, and the
PSLRA are now fixed deeply into the U.S. Code or court precedents. But discovery, by contrast, can change quickly due to technological developments
or Advisory Committee changes. Thus, affixing these doctrines to the vagaries of the discovery process is potentially destabilizing. Because discovery
now sits at the center of a network of doctrines, any changes to its reach
should (but may not) provoke concomitant changes throughout the litigation system. For example, if technological changes like machine learning reduce discovery costs, discovery-dependent doctrines like pleading standards
should immediately adjust, rendering existing case law outdated. Even more,
the Advisory Committee proposes rule changes on a regular basis. An
amendment to Federal Rule 26 that successfully reduces costs should have a
cascading effect on every doctrine that was justified as a prophylactic against
costly discovery: Twombly and Iqbal would be redundant; rules that encourage settlement unnecessary; qualified immunity obsolete; and even “rigorous” policing of class actions outdated. The difficulty, of course, is that
discovery-avoidance doctrines will not adapt and therefore the system will be
miscalibrated based on an outdated picture of discovery.
The expansion of these discovery-avoidance decisions or statutes creates
the danger of doctrinal accretion. Doctrines can pile up on top of other doctrines. For instance, a current class action against the police runs the danger
of running into three separate discovery-dependent doctrines: plausibility
pleading, qualified immunity, and rigorous review of class certification. A
plaintiff in this case is thus faced with three independent, but now accreted,
doctrines that are supposed to fight off the same thing—discovery costs. This
overdeters claims, is inefficient, and overcomplicates litigation.
Second, discovery avoidance empowers judges to create new doctrines
out of thin air and sidelines the expertise and flexibility of the Advisory
Committee. When discovery control rests on the wording of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, the Advisory Committee can carefully consider reforms and recalibrate the system to fit new technologies or legal developments. But the Supreme Court’s turn to doctrine to control discovery
weakens that equilibrium and empowers ideological judges. As previous
scholarship has explored, the Reagan and Bush Administrations began ap-

80. Scott Dodson, New Pleading, New Discovery, 109 MICH. L. REV. 53, 64 (2010) (“The
reason why the Supreme Court has pushed this change seems fairly obvious: the Court is concerned with high discovery costs.”).
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pointing judges committed to litigation reform in the 1980s. 81 Many of these
judges shared the view that plaintiffs’ attorneys had too much leeway under
our procedural paradigm. 82 They therefore embraced the idea of a judicial
retrenchment of civil procedure as a remedy. Debates over discovery costs
have given these judges—rather than the Advisory Committee—a tool to effect procedural change. Changes to qualified immunity or the PSLRA are all
etched on the case law. That move disempowers the Committee and also
constitutes a shift away from Advisory Committee review of empirical studies of discovery. That development contributes, yet again, to the miscalibration of the discovery process. 83
Finally, a sustained overemphasis on discovery costs has weakened the
discovery process more generally and robs the system of necessary improvements. While the Court initially recognized that discovery rules “are to
be accorded a broad and liberal treatment,” it has now moved toward a
much more constrained process. 84 And this goes beyond its embrace of discovery avoidance. Beginning with a Justice Powell concurrence that raised
the specter of “undue and uncontrolled discovery,” 85 the Supreme Court has
complained about broad discovery more generally, culminating with the
Chief Justice’s embrace of the 2015 reforms to discovery that were intended
to constrain the process. 86 This subtle shift from avoidance toward rejection
is likely to weaken the entire discovery process.
*

*

*

All of this means that discovery has helped install a series of procedural
doctrines that stand in the way of a plaintiff’s day in court and on the way
has disfigured case law and the rulemaking process. 87
II.

TRADITIONAL THEORIES OF DISCOVERY

Stepping back from the marriage of discovery and costs, the core difficulty is how to move the debate forward—how to actually determine whether we have an optimal discovery system. This question cannot solely be

81. See, e.g., Carl Tobias, Rethinking Federal Judicial Selection, 1993 BYU L. REV. 1257,
1264–74; cf. Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Litigation Reform: An Institutional Approach, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1543, 1551–55 (2014) (discussing litigation reform during the
Reagan Administration more generally).
82. See, e.g., Burbank & Farhang, supra note 81, at 1552–55 (discussing the Reagan Administration’s efforts to curtail “contingency litigation”)
83. Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 595 (1998) (characterizing the “Court of Appeals’ indirect effort to regulate discovery” as the use of “a blunt instrument that carries a high
cost”).
84. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947).
85. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 179 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring).
86. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 (amended Dec. 1, 2015).
87. See Dodson, supra note 80, at 64.
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answered by discussions about costs but must also be based on theory. 88 For
when it comes to assessing discovery, we should understand that it is a plural
device that serves many purposes at once that, at first sight, are difficult to
see. Only theory can allow us to properly weigh discovery costs against other
values in litigation and can ground the basic question: Why do we have a
discovery system and what are we attempting to achieve? In this Part, I focus
on this question but use the word “theory” loosely to refer to background
justifications or rationales. Many of the “theories” discussed below could
rightly be described as values that are nested within broader political theories.
As noted earlier, existing discovery jurisprudence does not provide a full
theoretical account because it relies on an incomplete view that discovery exists to promote fairness, accuracy, and settlements. That traditional view argues that discovery is beneficial because a full exchange of information
results in a fair and just resolution of a dispute 89 and a more accurate outcome, 90 and it allows one-shot plaintiffs to obtain critical information from
repeat player defendants. 91 Moreover, by forcing the parties to reveal all their
arguments and evidence, discovery renders trials redundant and nudges the
parties toward settlement. 92 Despite its prominence, however, the fairnessaccuracy-settlement conventional wisdom suffers from significant limitations—discussed further infra in Part III—because it misses the role that discovery has grown to play in complex litigation and private-enforcement
cases. 93 My goal in this Section is to very briefly explain the conventional

88. See generally Robert G. Bone, Making Effective Rules: The Need for Procedure Theory, 61 OKLA. L. REV. 319 (2008).
89. See Brazil, supra note 6, at 1298; E. Donald Elliott, How We Got Here: A Brief History of Requester-Pays and Other Incentive Systems to Supplement Judicial Management of Discovery, 71 VAND. L. REV. 1785, 1788 (2018); Irving R. Kaufman, Judicial Control Over
Discovery, 28 F.R.D. 111, 125 (1962) (“The federal rules are designed to find the truth . . . .”);
Alexandra D. Lahav, A Proposal to End Discovery Abuse, 71 VAND. L. REV. 2037, 2045 (2018);
Tidmarsh, supra note 42, at 1811 (“Principally, [discovery] ensures a rational and accurate
process for adjudicating or settling claims.”). This justification was clearly on the mind of the
Federal Rules’ framers. See Alexander Holtzoff, Instruments of Discovery Under Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 41 MICH. L. REV. 205, 205 (1942); Subrin, supra note 8, at 745. The Supreme
Court has also repeatedly endorsed the fairness rationale for discovery. See Cheney v. U.S. Dist.
Ct., 542 U.S. 367, 392 (2004) (Stevens, J., concurring); United States v. Procter & Gamble Co.,
356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958); see also Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Miller, 402 F.2d 134, 143 (8th Cir.
1968) (“The purpose of our modern discovery procedure is to narrow the issues, to eliminate
surprise, and to achieve substantial justice.”).
90. See Procter & Gamble, 356 U.S. at 682; Greyhound Lines, Inc., 402 F.2d at 143; Brazil,
supra note 6, at 1302.
91. See Burke v. N.Y.C. Police Dept., 115 F.R.D. 220, 225 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (“[T]he overriding policy [of discovery] is one of disclosure of relevant information in the interest of promoting the search for truth . . . .”); Lahav, supra note 89, at 2039, 2042–45 (discussing
discovery’s purposes in light of information asymmetries between plaintiffs and defendants).
92. Cooter & Rubinfeld, supra note 8, at 436.
93. Although scholars have admirably explored some justifications. See Robert G. Bone,
Agreeing to Fair Process: The Problem with Contractarian Theories of Procedural Fairness, 83
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view of discovery, which is based on the promotion of (1) fairness, (2) equality, and (3) trial narrowing or settlements. This exploration lays the groundwork for the full development of regulatory discovery in Part III.
Fairness. The most obvious justification for liberal discovery is that a full
exchange of information results in a fair resolution of a dispute and promotes the ends of justice. 94 As Justice Stevens noted, “[b]road discovery
should be encouraged when it serves the salutary purpose of facilitating the
prompt and fair resolution of concrete disputes.” 95 Fairness could be understood to promote goals that are consonant with procedural justice, including
participation, accuracy, and efficiency. 96 A fair process is one that “guarantees rights of meaningful participation,” and “notice and opportunity to be
heard.” 97 With an accuracy-participation-efficiency mantra as the North Star
of the system, it follows that discovery should be broad rather than narrow. 98
Ex ante, the more information that can be produced, the more the factfinder
can achieve an accurate outcome. In theory, limits to discovery might be antithetical to fairness. Although this fairness theory has been fundamental to
doctrinal developments in discovery, it has always failed to account for the
entirety of the discovery process.
Equality. Broad discovery has the potential to serve as an equalizer of litigant resources. This justification is closely related to the fairness one and is
sometimes treated as the same in the literature. But unlike the fairness account, this justification for discovery begins with the observation that the litigation system is riddled with resource asymmetries. 99 The role of discovery
and procedure is to ameliorate those asymmetries, create a level playing field,
eliminate trial “surprises,” and give different litigants equal access to jus-

B.U. L. REV. 485, 488–89 (2003); Cooter & Rubinfeld, supra note 8, at 436; Louis Kaplow &
Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare: Notes on the Pareto Principle, Preferences, and Distributive Justice, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 331 (2003); Jon O. Newman, Rethinking Fairness: Perspectives
on the Litigation Process, 94 YALE L.J. 1643, 1646–47 (1985). This Article draws on this literature but attempts to fully develop the regulatory theory, see infra Part III, and brings all theories together in a comprehensive analysis.
94. Brazil, supra note 6, at 1296.
95. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 542 U.S. 367, 392 (2004) (Stevens, J., concurring).
96. Solum, supra note 7, at 237, 244–60; Martin H. Redish, Electronic Discovery and the
Litigation Matrix, 51 DUKE L.J. 561, 567 (2001).
97. Solum, supra note 7, at 237, 244–60.
98. See Brazil, supra note 6.
99. For the traditional treatment of resource asymmetries from the law and society
scholarship, see Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits
of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974). For the traditional law and economics approaches, see George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1, 20 (1984), hypothesizing that there will be a “tendency toward 50 percent plaintiff victories” among litigated cases, and Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis Under Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 55,
56 (1982), describing the cost-benefit analyses parties engage at each stage of litigation.
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tice. 100 It is, in other words, to promote equality. 101 That concept is of course
“notoriously slippery . . . , and its procedural implications are puzzling.” 102
But in the context of discovery, we should be concerned with the concept
that William Rubenstein calls “equipage equality.” 103 That is the idea that adversarialism requires “a real battle between equally-armed contestants . . . [with] some measure of equality in the litigants’ capacities to
produce their proofs and arguments.” 104 This kind of equality is not concerned with substantive outcomes or even equality of treatment across cases. 105 Rather, Rubenstein argues that its focus is on the procedural
equipment that the system gives litigants—the arrows that litigants can have
in their quiver. Discovery can arm litigants with tools to remedy the inherent
asymmetry between plaintiffs and defendants. 106 It is a powerful factfinding
measure that provides small litigants access to documents or witness information that are otherwise only in the hands of a corporate defendant. 107 Discovery thus attempts to remedy informational asymmetries.
Narrowing Trials and Promoting Settlement. An institutional and historical account of discovery sees it as a tool that can narrow the scope of trial,
promote settlement, and perhaps sometimes replace common law trials and

100. Solum, supra note 7, at 287–88; see also Charles E. Clark, Edson Sunderland and the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 58 MICH. L. REV. 6, 11 (1959) (arguing that discovery under
the 1938 Rules “d[id] away with ‘surprise’ as a tactical advantage in litigation as a game”); Dodson, supra note 80, at 73–86 (proposing a new form of discovery to deal with information
asymmetries in the wake of heightened pleading).
101. See Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the
Values of Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 484 (1986) (“One value that might conceivably be fostered by procedural due process is the goal of equality.”); William B. Rubenstein,
The Concept of Equality in Civil Procedure, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1865, 1879 (2002) (“Modern
procedural practices themselves can also have equality-enhancing consequences. This is most
obvious in the Federal Rules’ embrace of notice pleading and liberal discovery.”).
102. Jerry L. Mashaw, Administrative Due Process: The Quest for a Dignitary Theory, 61
B.U. L. REV. 885, 899 (1981).
103. Rubenstein, supra note 101, at 1867.
104. Id. at 1867–68. See also Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees: The Right to Protect One’s Rights (pt. 1), 1973 DUKE L.J. 1153. See generally Judith
Resnik, Money Matters: Judicial Market Interventions Creating Subsidies and Awarding Fees
and Costs in Individual and Aggregate Litigation, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 2119, 2136 (2000) (“Equipage for civil litigants—from filing fees to investigation to counsel to experts—is generally left
either to the legislature or to the market.”).
105. Although equality may not promote justice or fair outcomes. See, e.g., Paul Stancil,
Substantive Equality and Procedural Justice, 102 IOWA L. REV. 1633 (2017).
106. Robert G. Bone, Modeling Frivolous Suits, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 519, 542 (1997); See
also Rubenstein, supra note 101, at 1880 (“Broad discovery has the effect of equalizing the information available to each side in the lawsuit.”).
107. Of course, confidentiality provisions can defeat this. See Seth Katsuya Endo, Contracting for Confidential Discovery, 53 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1249 (2020). And “discovery can also
work against poorer litigants [who] can be flooded with discovery requests.” Rubenstein, supra
note 101, at 1880.
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juries. 108 At common law, there was no robust discovery and trial was instead the defining information-flushing event of a case. In a system with jurors and no discovery, however, trials were expensive and burdensome and
allowed for potential late-stage surprises. One way to remedy that problem
was to expand the pretrial stage and allow the parties to fully explore relevant
documents and witnesses, narrowing issues for trial or even avoiding it.
Some of the Federal Rules drafters sought to avoid the burdens of the common law trial by infusing the system with equity’s flexibility and broad discovery. 109 In other words, they sought to make the pretrial stage the
fundamental information-exchanging event. Borrowing heavily from equity
and the common law trial, the federal rules allowed broad document requests and regularized the concept of oral depositions, allowing the parties
to directly interview the main witnesses outside of judicial supervision. 110
The main drafter of the discovery rules, Edson Sunderland, argued that
broad discovery would make trials narrower or even sometimes unnecessary 111 and may, along with other pretrial procedures, “bring parties to a
point where they will seriously discuss settlement.” 112
As expected, discovery has come to serve as one of the main prosettlement nudges in the procedure toolkit. While discovery and trials are separate
stages of litigation, they are nonetheless closely related because discovery
shapes the parties’ decision whether to settle or litigate. 113 A legal case can
generally be decided via dismissal, settlement, or a final judicial decision. If
the claim is meritorious, settlement can be highly efficient because it saves
the high transaction costs of trials. Under a standard economic view of litigation, parties decide to file suit (and settle or litigate) depending on their

108. See Engstrom, supra note 29, at 2, 35, 67–68; Yeazell, supra note 8, at 950–54; cf.
Langbein, supra note 1, at 533 (discussing how discovery substituted for the disclosure function of pleading in the Federal Rules). This rationale was frequently invoked by the framers of
the Federal Rules. See James A. Pike & John W. Willis, Federal Discovery in Operation, 7 U.
CHI. L. REV. 297 (1940) (endorsing the 1938 Rules on the grounds that discovery procedures
reduce burdens at trial); James A. Pike & John W. Willis, The New Federal DepositionDiscovery Procedure (pt. 1), 38 COLUM. L. REV. 1179 (1938) (same); Edson R. Sunderland, Discovery Before Trial Under the New Federal Rules, 15 TENN. L. REV. 737, 737–38 (1939) (describing a system that waits for trial to flush out information as “economically extravagant” and a
“wasteful method of civil litigation” and distinguishing the Federal Rules); Sunderland, supra
note 33, at 19–28.
109. Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 956–61 (1987).
110. Kessler, supra note 30 at 1230–31, 1253 (discussing how depositions mutated away
from masters to party-led questioning); see also Robin J. Effron, Ousted: The New Dynamics of
Privatized Procedure and Judicial Discretion, 98 B.U. L. REV. 127, 141 (2018) (“[T]he FRCP not
only tolerate private procedural ordering during discovery, but are designed to promote it.”).
111. Sunderland, supra note 8, at 75; see also Subrin, supra note 8, at 736.
112. Edson R. Sunderland, Scope and Method of Discovery Before Trial, 42 YALE L.J. 863,
864 (1933); Tidmarsh, supra note 43, at 1808 n.3 (discussing Edson Sunderland’s prosettlement
views).
113. See Yeazell, supra note 8, at 950–54.
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probability of success at trial, amount in dispute, and costs of litigation. 114 By
forcing the parties to engage in a thorough exchange of information, discovery shapes the parties’ calculation of probable success and therefore “increases settlements and decreases trials,” 115 even if it also forces the parties to rereveal weaknesses in their case. Discovery allows the parties to share the trial
transaction costs as bargaining surplus.
Since at least 1938, thanks partly to broad discovery, the system has
slowly evolved away from trials and toward an increasing number of dispositive motions or settlements. It is possible to justify this shift, and expensive
discovery, because it avoids the greater costs of impaneling juries and conducting trials. 116 But displacing trials and juries brings its own tradeoffs. The
drafters may have miscalculated by importing expensive inquisitorial discovery devices “into a common-law-based adversarial framework after 1938.” 117
Moreover, discovery may not always be a full or adequate substitute for trials, because it deprives judges and juries from the cases necessary to update
the common law. 118 Despite these tradeoffs, the record shows that it was part
and parcel of the project to create new procedural rules that discovery would
often promote settlement and narrow trials. 119
*

*

*

These three theories (or more properly, rationales or justifications) have
a wide variety of implications explored in Part IV. For now, it is sufficient to
note that they are based on different principles—fairness, equality, and judicial economy (or narrowing trials)—and lead to distinct background values
for discovery.
III. DISCOVERY AS REGULATION
This Part explores in a systematic manner an additional way to conceptualize discovery. My main argument is that one of discovery’s core purposes
in private-enforcement cases is actually divorced from adversarial litigation
and is, instead, entirely about systemic regulation. 120 In the private-

114. See John P. Gould, The Economics of Legal Conflicts, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 279 (1973);
William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J.L. & ECON. 61 (1971); Richard A.
Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL
STUD. 399 (1973).
115. Cooter & Rubinfeld, supra note 8, at 436.
116. But see John Bronsteen, Against Summary Judgment, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 522,
533 (2007).
117. Kessler, supra note 30, at 1184.
118. Burbank & Subrin, supra note 26, at 401.
119. Langbein, supra note 1, at 547.
120. See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 9, at 649. To be clear, this kind of discovery is only
relevant in cases that implicate public interests, not in private cases where individuals sue each
other without any significant statutes or public norms at stake.
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enforcement context, Congress uniquely chose private claims, and attendant
discovery, rather than agency regulation as the main administrative mechanism. 121 In those cases, litigation is a regulatory tool and broad discovery
transforms into an essential regulatory device comparable to the administrative subpoena. By forcing parties to disclose large amounts of information,
discovery deters harmful behavior and, most importantly, structures the
primary behavior of regulated entities. As I discuss later, this means that
courts should be more permissive with discovery requests in privateenforcement cases than in typical litigation.
Discovery even manifests in similar ways in the private action and administrative contexts. Both agency bureaucrats and private plaintiffs are engaged in the work of flushing out information using analogous tools in order
to enforce some broad statutory mandate. Courts have thus treated private
and public regulators in similar ways. In this section, I explain that discovery
serves regulatory purposes in at least two ways: (1) it delegates to private
plaintiffs government subpoena power to investigate wrongdoing; and (2) it
has significant positive spillover effects on regulated entities and markets.
Discovery therefore serves an important purpose in a system that relies on
private litigants to enforce the law. 122
A. Discovery as the Lynchpin of Private Enforcement
As many have recognized, the United States employs litigation as a regulatory tool by allowing private litigants to enforce important statutes in the
contexts of antitrust, environmental law, business competition, and employment, among other areas, building what some scholars call a “litigation
state.” 123 As I argue below, discovery is the lynchpin of this privateenforcement system because it is necessary to enforce these statutory regimes, shapes litigants’ ex ante expectations, structures plaintiffs’ attorneys’
choices, and influences the behavior of regulated entities. While discovery
plays this unique role in this enforcement context, it likely lacks the same
underlying legitimacy in other cases, like mass torts or state-law claims.
In contrast to European and most other countries, where bureaucracies
regulate ex ante, U.S. private litigants enforce the law ex post and without
much government involvement. Although plaintiffs pursue their own indi-

121.
122.

See infra notes 124–126.
Several scholars have made some headway into the regulatory justification.
BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 3; Carrington, supra note 9, at 54; Jack H. Friedenthal, A
Divided Supreme Court Adopts Discovery Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
69 CALIF. L. REV. 806, 819–20 (1981); Higginbotham, supra note 9; see also FARHANG, supra
note 13, at 8; Burbank, supra note 9; Burbank et al., supra note 51, at 662–63; Matthew A.
Shapiro, Delegating Procedure, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 983, 1007 (2018); Yeazell, supra note 8, at
950–54 (“The system, though essentially private and adversarial, can marshal facts in a manner
that resembles an administrative investigation.”).
123. FARHANG, supra note 13, at 64–65; KAGAN, supra note 10, at 6–9; Glover, supra note
10, at 1140.
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vidual interests in litigation, they promote social welfare by enforcing the law
and deterring wrongdoing. 124 Most importantly, private litigation is a regulatory tool because Congress and courts have deliberately empowered litigants
through private rights of action, fee-shifting provisions, and other incentives—thus building a litigation state. 125 That is, in some of our most important statutes, Congress had the choice whether to create new agencies or
rely on plaintiffs through a private right of action. And while in some cases
Congress did create agencies like the EPA or FTC, in other statutes Congress
instead delegated joint or sole enforcement power to private plaintiffs. 126
Within the litigation state, private lawsuits transform into a kind of regulatory tool. Most scholars define the word regulation as including “any governmental effort to control behavior by other entities, such as business firms,
subordinate levels of government, nonstate entities (such as political campaigns or civil society actors), or individuals.” 127 Such a working definition
encompasses litigation when it is deliberately employed by Congress. Conceiving litigation as regulation transforms the legal system from one where
“one citizen can seek redress from another in an orderly fashion” 128 into one
where citizens or classes of citizens can enforce the law for systemic regulatory purposes. For example, lawsuits by private parties against businesses
under competition or antitrust statutes can be aimed to shape behavior for
legitimate governmental ends—controlling market entry or prices, limiting
monopolies, or improving efficiency. 129 More broadly, regulation through
litigation can influence entities by prohibiting wrongdoing, forcing companies to internalize the full costs of their conduct, or incentivizing certain behavior. The role of private parties as regulators is even clearer when they
operate side-by-side with agencies and bureaucracies that enforce the very
same statutes. Just like the SEC and securities class actions often aim to prevent securities fraud to preserve efficient markets, so too do the EPA and the
National Environmental Law Center both aim to safeguard the environment.
Within this complex ecosystem of enforcement, private litigants have
powerful litigation tools that they can employ against regulated entities, including broad discovery. Contingency fees, attorney advertising, class actions, punitive damages, and private rights of action make the initial filing of

124. See LAHAV, supra note 13; cf. Steven Shavell, The Fundamental Divergence Between
the Private and the Social Motive to Use the Legal System, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 575, 585 (1997)
(explaining that “it may be socially desirable for more to be spent on suit than the amount at
stake” when a lawsuit can “create substantial deterrence”).
125. See Burbank & Farhang, supra note 48, at 16; see also BURBANK & FARHANG, supra
note 3, at 15–16.
126. FARHANG, supra note 13, at 60, 64–65; KAGAN, supra note 10, at 6–9.
127. Christopher H. Foreman, Regulatory Agencies, in 20 INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 181 (James D. Wright ed., 2d ed.
2015); see also Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative Process, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3 (1998).
128. Friedenthal, supra note 11, at 69.
129. Foreman, supra note 127, at 181.

October 2020]

Discovery as Regulation

97

a claim feasible by incentivizing plaintiffs’ attorneys with the potential for a
large recovery. 130 Those devices are therefore a key entry into the litigation
state. But discovery is the lynchpin of the private-enforcement system because it shapes the parties’ ex ante expectations of whether they will be able
to flush out wrongdoing and effectively pursue their case. It can structure
plaintiffs’ attorneys’ choice whether to file a case on behalf of an aggrieved
party or not. And it influences the behavior of regulated entities who understand the information flushing tools at plaintiffs’ disposal. In areas like employment discrimination, for instance, plaintiffs’ attorneys calculate whether
discovery will produce evidence of biased treatment.
There is a necessary relationship between private-enforcement statutes
and broad discovery. Once past the pleading stage, discovery allows plaintiffs
to effectively become quasi-government investigators, or as courts sometimes note in limited circumstances, private attorneys general. In situations
of imperfect information, as I discuss below, broad discovery empowers
plaintiffs with a variety of tools to seek out wrongdoing. Take, for example,
three private-enforcement regimes and the kinds of evidence plaintiffs need:
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Title VII prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of sex, race, color, national origin, and religion. 131 Private suits are the overwhelming mode of enforcement, accounting for 98
percent of suits while government actions account for only 2 percent. 132 In
disparate treatment cases, plaintiff-employees must establish that an employer made an adverse decision based on “a discriminatory intent or motive.” 133 This question is heavily fact-dependent. But employers almost never
leave a “ ‘smoking gun’ attesting to a discriminatory intent,” so plaintiffs “often must build their cases from pieces of circumstantial evidence which cumulatively undercut the credibility of the various explanations offered by the
employer.” 134 Disparate impact cases also need specific data that can show
“an employer’s overall pattern of conduct.” 135 Broad discovery over a wide
array of employer documents is the sine qua non of these cases. 136 For instance, comparative studies show that despite the presence of robust civil antidiscrimination laws in France, those statutes remain drastically
underenforced because there is no expansive American-style discovery. 137
130. See Owen M. Fiss, The Political Theory of the Class Action, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
21, 24 (1996).
131. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
132. Glover, supra note 10, at 1149–50.
133. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 577 (2009).
134. Marcus, supra note 4, at 750 (quoting Hollander v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 895 F.2d 80,
84–85 (2d Cir. 1990)).
135. Id. at 750 (quoting Burns v. Thiokol Chem. Corp., 483 F.2d 300, 305 (5th Cir.
1973)).
136. See id. (“Indeed, on one level one could say that certain types of discrimination
claims are only possible with such discovery.”).
137. See Julie C. Suk, Procedural Path Dependence: Discrimination and the Civil-Criminal
Divide, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1315, 1335 (2008) (“The main problem that arises for plaintiffs
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The Supreme Court has even explicitly noted that specific causation in these
cases is a fair requirement because “liberal civil discovery rules give plaintiffs
broad access to employers’ records.” 138
Antitrust Laws. The Sherman Act gives plaintiffs a private right of action
against individuals or firms engaged in a “contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce.” 139 The Clayton Act similarly
seeks to prevent or punish anticompetitive conduct by “bring[ing] to bear
the pressure of ‘private attorneys general’ on a serious national problem for
which public prosecutorial resources are deemed inadequate.” 140 Private
claims “accounted for about 90% of antitrust filings in federal court each
year between 1975 and 2012.” 141 And empirical studies “have confirmed that
those private enforcement actions are effective in deterring anticompetitive
behavior.” 142 Private claimants are often competitors or consumers harmed
by anticompetitive conduct. Broad discovery is also necessary in these cases.
For example, in cases alleging the existence of a cartel, the burden is on the
plaintiff to establish a conspiracy to restrain trade. In such cases, “only the
defendant will know or have the means to discover . . . whether it actually
conspired. Moreover, the plaintiff usually cannot ascertain this fact through
a reasonable prefiling investigation.” 143 To make matters more difficult for
would-be claimants, “[m]odern cartels employ extreme measures to avoid
detection.” 144 Pretrial discovery, however, can give plaintiffs access to schedules, communications, and emails that may evince a conspiracy. Broad discovery has thus become the main tool by which plaintiffs can ascertain the
existence of certain antitrust violations. 145
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The FLSA sets minimum wage and
hour regulations in employment contracts and allows employees to sue employers for minimum hourly wage and overtime payments. 146 Although the
Department of Labor has concurrent enforcement power, it “investigates
fewer than 1% of FLSA-covered employers each year” and must instead “rely

claiming discriminatory hiring in the [French] civil context is that parties cannot compel discovery of evidence in the adversary’s hands to acquire evidence that would prove the elements
of one’s own case.”).
138. Marcus, supra note 4, at 751 (quoting Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S.
642, 657 (1989)); see also Suzette M. Malveaux, The Jury (or More Accurately the Judge) Is Still
Out for Civil Rights and Employment Cases Post-Iqbal, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 719, 725–27
(2012–2013).
139. 15 U.S.C. § 1.
140. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S. 143, 151 (1987).
141. Brief of Antitrust Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 12, Apple
Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514 (2018) (No. 17-204), 2018 WL 4773103, at *12.
142. Id.
143. Brief of American Antitrust Institute in Support of Respondents at 4, Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (No. 05-1126).
144. Id. at 10.
145. See id. at 4.
146. 29 U.S.C. § 202.
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on private parties to take a lead role in enforcing wage and hours laws.” 147
Private claims are in turn overwhelmingly enforced as class actions, allowing
employees to band together in pursuit of backpay. Here’s where discovery
steps in: in order to prove their work claims, employees must often rely on
company records. 148 In some cases, those records include detailed information about company practices, communications, and even videos. 149
Those records are only available because of broad discovery.
Congress has enacted some of these statutes, and subsequent amendments, on the open assumption that broad discovery was essential and would
be available. 150 For example, during debates over the Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972, supporters of an EEOC litigation approach—
rather than cease-and-desist enforcement—argued that “[t]he Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure . . . with respect to discovery . . . would greatly facilitate
the collection of evidence for trial.” 151 Similarly, some organizations that
supported the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976 argued that
attorney’s fees should be awarded to the prevailing party because “it is necessary for the plaintiff to engage in possibly staggering discovery costs,” and
these costs “should not be put on the litigant, but instead should be paid by
the defendant.” 152 By authorizing fee shifting, the statute protected, enshrined, and legitimated broad discovery. Further, in debates over the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, Senators accepted the availability of broad discovery and
complained only that it was not enough to ensure enforcement. For instance,
Senator Jeffords asked “[h]ow realistic [wa]s the U.S. Supreme Court’s assertion that since you have discovery procedures now that really the plaintiff is
able to ascertain as to what the motives of the employer were?” 153 William H.

147. Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1647 (2018) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Glover, supra note 10, at 1150–51).
148. See, e.g., Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1043 (2016).
149. Id.
150. See FARHANG, supra note 13, at 8 (listing discovery as a central “litigant power[]”
Title VII framers characterized as necessary to Title VII’s private enforcement regime); see also
BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 3, at 15–16. See generally FARHANG, supra note 13 (exploring the development of major civil rights private enforcement regimes).
151. Equal Employment Opportunities Enforcement Act of 1971: Hearings on S. 2515, S.
2617 & H.R. 1746 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the S. Comm. on Labor & Pub. Welfare,
92nd Cong. 185 (1971) (statement of John N. Erlenborn, Rep. of the 14th District of Ill.).
152. Legal Fees: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Representation of Citizen Interests of
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 93rd Cong. 1136–37 (1973) (statement of Sylvia Roberts, Attorney, Baton Rouge, La., Chairperson, Legal Defense Fund, National Organization for Women).
153. Civil Rights Act of 1990: Hearing on S. 2104 Before the S. Comm. on Labor & Human
Resources, 101st Cong. 178 (1989) [hereinafter Civil Rights Act Hearing]. Justice Stevens’ dissent in Wards Cove made a similar point. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642,
673 n.20 (1989) (“The Court discounts the difficulty its causality requirement presents for employees, reasoning that they may employ ‘liberal civil discovery rules’ to obtain the employer’s
statistical personnel records. Even assuming that this generally is true, it has no bearing in this
litigation, since it is undisputed that petitioners did not preserve such records.” (citations omitted)).
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Brown, former Chairman of the EEOC, observed that while “the discovery
process [wa]s designed under [the] Federal [R]ules to ferret out certain kinds
of information,” many of an employer’s reasons for making hiring decisions
“are so obscure that no amount of discovery is going to be able to discover
that.” 154 In these legislative debates, broad discovery was a fundamental
background principle.
Not only has Congress continued to expand rights of action—for instance, by adding fee shifting to the Civil Rights Act in 1976 and 1991, or
through alternative enforcement avenues in the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust
Improvement Act of 1976—but it has also considered and rejected proposals
to limit private enforcement under the FLSA and other statutes. 155 And while
Congress has significantly altered other procedural rules in the past few decades, it has not attempted to weaken broad discovery in these statutes. 156 Judicial narrowing of discovery for these statutory rights may therefore lack
fidelity to the original legislative bargain.
Setting aside the link between these private-enforcement regimes and
discovery, there is even a close historical connection between a regulatory
view of discovery and the litigation state. Many key statutes emerged largely
in the mid-1960s and 70s, including the Civil Rights Act and an array of environmental protection laws. 157 A 1970 Supreme Court decision also allowed
private securities claims for the first time. 158 These areas came to rely, at their
core, on private enforcement. Just around that time, the Advisory Committee took the key historical step toward regulatory discovery. In 1970 the
Committee amended the standards for document production, removing the
long-standing requirement that parties needed prior judicial approval and a
showing of “good cause.” 159 With those mechanistic requirements out of the
way, plaintiffs were unleashed to enforce the constellation of new federal
statutes that were emerging and consolidating in that era.

154. Civil Rights Act Hearing, supra note 153, at 178 (statement of William H. Brown).
155. See, e.g., Sean Farhang, The Political Development of Job Discrimination Litigation,
1963–1976, 23 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 23, 40–41 (2009); Glover, supra note 10, at 1150.
156. See, e.g., Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109
Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); Class Action Fairness Act of
2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1453, 1711–
1715).
157. Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Continuing Innovation of Citizen Enforcement, 2000
U. ILL. L. REV. 185, 192; Robinson Meyer, How the U.S. Protects the Environment, from Nixon
to Trump, ATLANTIC (Mar. 29, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive
/2017/03/how-the-epa-and-us-environmental-law-works-a-civics-guide-pruitt-trump/521001
[https://perma.cc/C8QC-BV2K].
158. Superintendent of Ins. of N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 (1971).
159. Jeffrey W. Stempel, Politics and Sociology in Federal Civil Rulemaking: Errors of
Scope, 52 ALA. L. REV. 529, 540–41 (2001). The 1970 Amendments have been called the “apogee” of broad discovery, id. at 540–42, and the “highwater mark” of procedural reform, Marcus, supra note 4, at 748 (contrasting the scope of discovery before and after the 1970
Amendments).
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What about mass torts? This framework does not seem to apply in the
common law, and especially mass torts, context. There is a distinction as to
the source of legitimacy in these two types of claims. In mass torts cases, unlike private-enforcement statutes, Congress has not deliberately chosen private plaintiffs as the primary enforcers, 160 nor has it established a uniform
federal law on the topic. 161 Instead, whether regulatory discovery is legitimate may depend on the relationship between state common law and state
and federal discovery. While there may be other reasons to recognize discovery as regulation in common law claims, it must be supported by a different
set of arguments. One might worry, for instance, that even though mass torts
serve deterrent purposes, tort theory was originally rooted in a conception of
litigation that emphasized remedies for private wrongdoing. 162 Statutes like
Title VII, by contrast, were explicitly meant to serve a broader purpose and
have been interpreted to “focus[] on ‘systems and effects’ rather than tortlike individual wrongs.” 163 Moreover, because federal statutory claims are
mostly enforced in federal court, their relationship to discovery can be uniform and informed by Congress. 164 State common law serves multiple masters: state courts and legislatures and federal courts. 165 So, again, the question
of legitimacy is distinct and needs other supporting theories.
Setting legitimacy aside, however, the regulatory effect of discovery in
mass torts cases may be very similar, or perhaps identical, to that in privateenforcement cases. Just as antitrust claims can promote deterrence and industry regulation, products liability or mass tort claims can achieve the same
results. 166 Because of this similarity of outcome or effect, I retain examples
from torts and common law cases as informative and illustrative of regulatory discovery.

160. While tort can “exist[] alongside regulation[],” it remains a separate, state-based
mechanism. See Engstrom, supra note 10, at 305–07.
161. See Elizabeth D. De Armond, A Dearth of Remedies, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 1, 37
(2008) (“Tort law allows states to develop diverse policies that suit the needs of their particular
citizens . . . .”).
162. Fleming James, Jr., Damages in Accident Cases, 41 CORNELL L.Q. 582, 582–83
(1956).
163. Margaret H. Lemos, The Consequences of Congress’s Choice of Delegate: Judicial and
Agency Interpretations of Title VII, 63 VAND. L. REV. 363, 389, 397 (2010); see also Justin D.
Weitz, A Necessary Supplement: Reinvigorating Civil RICO’s Securities Fraud Predicate, 21
WIDENER L. REV. 27, 31 (2015) (describing how private enforcement plays a broader role than
torts in securities litigation because it seeks to punish wrongdoers).
164. See Lemos, supra note 163, at 430 (“Agencies[] [have the] ability to render a clear,
uniform national rule on any given statutory question . . . .”).
165. See De Armond, supra note 161, at 37 (“The common law . . . chang[es] shape with
each new decision . . . .”); Rabin, supra note 13, at 294–95 (explaining how Congress can statutorily preempt state common law).
166. See supra notes 139–145 and accompanying text.
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B. Discovery as Administrative Subpoena Power
There are close similarities between private-enforcement discovery and
the administrative state, underlining discovery’s regulatory role. The primary lesson of this Section is that discovery’s resemblance to administrative
subpoenas in the private-enforcement context shows that we should conceptualize discovery as a regulatory device that shapes and structures the behavior of regulated entities.
The absolute “backbone of an administrative agency’s effectiveness is the
ability to investigate rapidly the activities of entities within the agency’s jurisdiction.” 167 Although regulated entities usually provide information voluntarily, 168 agencies’ main investigatory tool is the administrative subpoena,
an agency request compelling the production of documents or testimony
without preapproval from courts or grand juries. 169 That is why almost all
agencies have subpoena power. 170 Agencies’ authority to issue subpoenas is
not inherent; it directly derives from congressional authorization in enabling
acts (in addition to Section 555(d) of the Administrative Procedure Act). 171
Congress has provided agencies the authority to compel reports or internal
documents since the Interstate Commission Act of 1887, setting a precedent
for the later development of the administrative state. 172 According to the Department of Justice Office of Legal Policy, there are now “approximately 335
existing administrative subpoena authorities held by . . . executive branch
entities under current law.” 173
When regulated entities refuse to comply with a request, agency statutes
authorize agency officials to either “apply directly to an appropriate U.S. district court for enforcement assistance” or “request the Attorney General’s aid
in applying to a U.S. district court for enforcement assistance.” 174 In addition, agencies can issue civil investigative demands, which are broad requests
for information even before any investigation has officially begun. 175
The Supreme Court has recognized a broad administrative subpoena
power that extends widely over regulated entities, an acknowledgement that
“overbearing limitation of these authorities would leave administrative enti-

167. Campbell, supra note 15, at 396.
168. 2 KRISTIN E. HICKMAN & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE
§ 8.1 (6th ed. 2019).
169. See OFF. OF LEGAL POL’Y, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE USE OF
ADMINISTRATIVE SUBPOENA AUTHORITIES BY EXECUTIVE BRANCH AGENCIES AND ENTITIES 6–
7 (2002).
170. WILLIAM F. FOX, UNDERSTANDING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 100 (6th ed. 2012).
171. OFF. OF LEGAL POL’Y, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 169, at 6.
172. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, supra note 168, § 8.1.
173. OFF. OF LEGAL POL’Y, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 169, at 5.
174. Id.
175. See John Niemann, A Closer Look at the CFPB Civil Investigative Demand, CFPB J.
(Jul. 23, 2016), https://cfpbjournal.com/a-closer-look-at-the-cfpb-civil-investigative-demand/
[https://perma.cc/AKP8-9CJC].
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ties unable to execute their respective statutory responsibilities.” 176 Agencies’
subpoena power is a critical element inexorably intertwined with broader
regulatory schemes. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA), EPA, and Department of Labor, for example, need a routine and
uncontroversial method to investigate compliance with labor and environmental regulations. That is why parties cannot easily object to an administrative subpoena and why in most litigation regulatory agencies “have obtained
essentially all the information they have sought from private parties.” 177 In
Civil Aeronautics Board v. Hermann, the Court emphasized that a determination of relevance should mostly be left to agencies, as long as they follow
the appropriate procedure and their internal chains of command. 178 Indeed,
agencies have previously threatened to file sanctions against lawyers for opposing or refusing to comply with subpoenas on feeble grounds. 179
Civil discovery’s broad scope could be seen as an extension (or outsourced version) of administrative subpoena power, and one could say that
private discovery is directly analogous to an administrative subpoena. 180
Congress has enacted statutes that deliberately depend on private plaintiffs
to enforce them, and in order for these statutes to succeed, just like agencies,
private plaintiffs need broad and powerful tools to investigate legal violations. 181 Perhaps that power should be more or less constrained in the context of private parties—discussed further infra in Section IV.C—because they
lack the public or democratic legitimacy of government officials. But if plaintiffs truly are exercising government power, discovery rules should look very
similar to those governing administrative subpoena power. And, as expected,
they do.
Administrative subpoena powers actually resemble private discovery
across several dimensions: (1) ex parte issuance; (2) breadth of scope and judicial standards of review; (3) specific tools and devices; and (4) the costs of
production. These dimensions serve regulatory functions by giving broad
independence, flexibility, and scope to regulators. At the same time, as discussed below, administrative subpoenas and private discovery are different
in significant ways that correct for private enforcers’ lack of democratic legitimacy. There are a series of important distinctions between the two discovery devices—for instance, subpoena power exists prior to any litigation—that
make the two kinds of discovery far from identical. I do not mean to suggest
that private and public discovery are interchangeable, but only that they re-

176. OFF. OF LEGAL POL’Y, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 169, at 7 (first citing United
States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 (1950); then citing Okla. Press Publ’g Co. v. Walling,
327 U.S. 186 (1946); and then citing Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U.S. 501 (1943)).
177. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, supra note 168, § 8.1.
178. 353 U.S. 322, 323 (1957) (per curiam).
179. See OFF. OF LEGAL POL’Y, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 169, at 11.
180. BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 3, at 70; see also Carrington, supra note 9, at 54;
Higginbotham, supra note 9, at 4–5.
181. FARHANG, supra note 13, at 60, 64–65.
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semble each other in important ways that indicate a common regulatory
foundation.
1.

Ex Parte Issuance

Both private plaintiffs and agencies can issue subpoenas ex parte—a
court only becomes involved ex post if the responding party moves to quash
or for a protective order. The ability to issue discovery requests without any
prior judicial approval is one of the most distinctive aspects of American discovery. And it has grown to be both powerful and essential in the context of
regulation. Regulated industries generate vast amounts of information on a
day-to-day basis. Prior judicial approval would constitute a substantial impediment that would increase transaction costs, decrease the amount of relevant information, and potentially disrupt the regulatory process.
Agencies can require entities to produce some information both on a
regular basis or for specific investigatory purposes. For example, the SEC requires publicly listed companies to submit an array of forms regarding their
financial performance or activities. 182 The FTC, too, requires the submission
of a collection of documents related to potential mergers. But outside these
regularized channels, in order for agencies to even begin to understand their
relevant industries, let alone identify wrongdoing, they must probe regulated
entities with information requests. Courts have thus upheld agency powers
to subject companies to searches or even inspections in the context of regulated commercial activity. 183 And agencies have expanded their power to collect information from “those who are not the custodians of required records
and who do not have any sua sponte reporting duties.” 184 That is why in
United States v. Morton Salt Co., the Court upheld broad administrative
powers to obtain presuit information, even if requests for such information
constitute “fishing expeditions.” 185 This power is fundamentally independent
of the judicial process unless and until a party challenges an administrative
action in court.
Internal agency procedures for issuing administrative subpoenas or civil
investigative demands are expansive and relatively unconstrained. To issue
an investigative demand, FTC needs only a “reason to believe” that the targeted entity has “relevant” information to “unfair or deceptive acts or practices . . . affecting commerce.” 186 These suspicions can be triggered by

182. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, supra note 168, § 8.1.
183. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987); Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981);
United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972); Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397
U.S. 72 (1970).
184. Graham Hughes, Administrative Subpoenas and the Grand Jury: Converging Streams
of Criminal and Civil Compulsory Process, 47 VAND. L. REV. 573, 585 (1994).
185. 338 U.S. 632, 641–42 (1950).
186. OFF. OF LEGAL POL’Y, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 169, app. A2 (quoting 15
U.S.C. § 57b-1(c)).
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newspaper articles or employee tip-offs. 187 And the FTC’s internal procedure
only requires a signature by “a Commissioner pursuant to a Commission
resolution.” 188 Similarly, in National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) proceedings, regional directors as well as “any person filing a charge or petition
under the NLRA,” including employers or employees, can apply to the Board
for a subpoena “in order to obtain evidence that relates to any matter under
investigation or in question” within the NLRB. 189 The postmaster general of
the U.S. Postal Service can issue subpoenas after an “appropriate supervisory
and legal review of request.” 190 SEC commissioners (and designated officers)
“may subpoena witnesses, take evidence, and require the production of documentary evidence deemed relevant or material to an investigation under
the Act.” 191 Agency investigations can be triggered by little more than “official curiosity” 192 and often result from random inspections. 193 And EPA administrators “may require a person who owns or operates any emission
source . . . who the Administrator believes may have information necessary
for the purposes set forth in this subsection” to submit records and information related to air pollution. 194 These agencies generally require approval
through internal processes that only sometimes involve high-level officials. 195
Private discovery resembles agency power in that it is a fundamentally
independent process that, after pleading, is not constrained by prior judicial
approval. The 1938 discovery rules embodied the progressive conviction—
also embraced by regulatory agencies—that “effective regulation was impossible without access to the facts concerning the regulated enterprise.” 196
From 1938 until 1970, however, the federal discovery rules required prior
judicial approval for any document subpoena, “upon a showing of good
cause.” 197 But, as discussed above, the Advisory Committee eliminated this
requirement in 1970, allowing private parties to request any information that
could plausibly be relevant. To be sure, unlike agency officials wielding administrative subpoena power, private plaintiffs must first file a complaint
and potentially survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule 8. But even in
that context, just as courts after Twombly and Iqbal require that a complaint
must meet a “plausibility” standard before discovery sets in, many courts

187. Eric L. Yaffe & Christopher A. Nowak, The Unwelcome Phone Call—Responding to
Regulatory Audits and Investigations, 37 FRANCHISE L.J. 393, 394 (2018).
188. OFF. OF LEGAL POL’Y, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 169, app. A2.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. 2 AM. JUR. 2D Administrative Law § 107, Westlaw (database updated May 2020).
193. Therese Maynard, SEC v. Jerry T. O’Brien, Inc.: Has the Supreme Court Overruled
United States v. Powell?, 18 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 643, 646–47 (1985).
194. OFF. OF LEGAL POL’Y, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 169, app. A2.
195. See id. at 26.
196. BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 3, at 69.
197. Friedenthal, supra note 11, at 80 n.44.
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have required agencies to make “plausible arguments” in support of their jurisdiction. 198 Still, this plausibility analysis only takes place after a subpoena
is issued, while in private-enforcement cases the defendant can move to dismiss prior to any discovery. But some statutes have empowered plaintiffs to
obtain discovery prior to filing any lawsuit at all. For example, Federal Rule
27 allows a party to take a presuit deposition to perpetuate testimony. 199
On the whole, both administrative subpoena power and private discovery are unburdened by prior judicial approval, allowing private and public
regulators to investigate wrongdoing.
2.

Scope and Standards of Review

Judicial ex post review of discovery requests is broadly deferential to
both private and public regulators. Courts give agencies “great latitude in
supplying justification for the issuance” of administrative subpoenas. 200 Specifically, the Supreme Court has only required a good-faith or reasonable issuance, asking lower courts to review whether an agency investigation
promotes a legitimate purpose, the information is reasonably relevant, and
the agency has followed the requisite administrative steps. 201 In United States
v. Powell, the Court rejected the applicability of a probable cause standard to
agency subpoenas. 202 That is why agency statutes allow officials to seek broad
subpoenas over information:
•

FTC: “relevant to unfair or deceptive acts or practices,” 203

•

NLRB: “that relates to any matter under investigation,” 204

•

SEC: “deemed relevant or material to an investigation under the
[Securities] Act,” 205 and

•

FEC: “relating to the execution of the Commission’s duties.” 206

Regulated entities almost never succeed in challenging an administrative
subpoena on scope, burden, or other reasons. 207 In the seminal decision En198. E.g., EEOC v. Kloster Cruise Ltd., 939 F.2d 920, 922 (11th Cir. 1991).
199. FED. R. CIV. P. 27.
200. Stephen V. Wilson & A. Howard Matz, Obtaining Evidence for Federal Economic
Crime Prosecutions: An Overview and Analysis of Investigative Methods, 14 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
651, 655 (1977), as reprinted in PARALLEL GRAND JURY AND ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY
INVESTIGATIONS 29, 35 (Neil A. Kaplan et al. eds., 1981).
201. OFF. OF LEGAL POL’Y, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 169, at 7–8; see also, e.g., United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950) (finding that the inquiry must be within
the agency’s authority, not too indefinite, and reasonably relevant).
202. 379 U.S. 48, 57–58 (1964).
203. OFF. OF LEGAL POL’Y, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 169, app. A2.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. See ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, supra note 168, §§ 8.1–2.
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dicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, the Court held that a district court has the
duty to enforce an administrative subpoena as long as it is not “plainly incompetent or irrelevant to any lawful purpose.” 208 Even the most exacting
courts have only required agencies to make a “ ‘plausible’ argument in support of its assertion of jurisdiction” before enforcing a subpoena. 209 Other
courts have required much less. In United States v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., the
First Circuit rejected a challenge against an OSHA subpoena, noting that
“[a]s long as the agency’s assertion of authority is not obviously apocryphal,
a procedurally sound subpoena must be enforced.” 210 For this reason, courts
have been largely deferential to agency subpoenas. For example, the SEC’s
power is so vast in scope that some have claimed there is “little that the SEC
cannot obtain.” 211 Courts accept this broad scope even when there is no
agency interest in litigation because agencies can use investigative powers for
broader purposes. 212
Courts police private-discovery requests more closely but are often similarly deferential. The general standard under Rule 26 is that plaintiffs can obtain “discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any
party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case.” 213 Information “need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.” 214 Prior to
the 2015 amendments—which shifted the proportionality analysis and eliminated other language—the rule explicitly noted that requests could be “reasonably calculated” to lead to admissible evidence. 215 It is unclear whether
the 2015 amendments have substantially constrained the discovery process. 216 Either way, the standard triggers flexible judicial review over “whether good cause exists for authorizing [a request] so long as it is relevant to the
subject matter of the action.” 217 Under this standard, courts often impose the
burden on the “party opposing discovery to show that it is not relevant.” 218

208. 317 U.S. 501, 509 (1943).
209. EEOC v. Kloster Cruise Ltd., 939 F.2d 920, 922 (11th Cir. 1991).
210. 84 F.3d 1, 5–6 (1st Cir. 1996).
211. DAVID F. LINOWES, PRIVACY IN AMERICA: IS YOUR PRIVATE LIFE IN THE PUBLIC
EYE? 85 (1989).
212. See United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950) (“Even if one were to
regard the request for information in this case as caused by nothing more than official curiosity, nevertheless law-enforcing agencies have a legitimate right to satisfy themselves that corporate behavior is consistent with the law and the public interest.”).
213. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
214. Id.
215. FED. R. CIV. P. 26 (amended Dec. 1, 2015).
216. For a discussion of the amendments’ relationship to judicial discretion and delegated procedural power, see Effron, supra note 110.
217. FED R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note (2000); see also 8 CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2008, Westlaw (database updated April
2020) (collecting cases).
218. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 217, § 2008 (collecting cases); e.g., Everest Indem. Ins.
Co. v. QBE Ins. Corp., 980 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 1277–78 (W.D. Wash. 2013); Silicon Knights, Inc.
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On the whole, the limits of private discovery are difficult to ascertain, but are
nonetheless liberally construed by most courts.
3.

Specific Tools and Devices

Beyond similarities in issuance and judicial review, there is also significant overlap in the tools available to private litigants via discovery and administrative officials via the subpoena power. At the core of both systems are
two types of subpoena: ad testificandum, requiring testimony (depositions),
and duces tecum, requiring the production of documents. These two types of
subpoena constitute the lifeblood of the administrative and litigation
states. 219 Both agencies and private parties can also issue third-party subpoenas, allowing agencies and litigants to seek documents from nonparties—for
instance, a bank, internet service provider, or business in possession of personal documents—related to the target of an agency investigation. 220
Granted, the similarities should not be overstated. Discovery powers
within the administrative state exceed the subpoena power and are more diverse than anything available in the private context. The subpoena power is
just one of an agency’s broad investigative powers independent of the initiation of formal action. 221 Others include requirements for recordkeeping (for
instance, records necessary for those seeking to deduct expenses on tax returns) and reporting (for instance, IRS Form 1040), 222 and the power to conduct periodic (and usually unannounced) inspections of persons and
businesses within their jurisdiction. 223
The administrative subpoena power is also not uniform. It is typically
understood to “include all powers, regardless of name, that Congress has
granted to federal agencies to make an administrative or civil investigatory
demand compelling document production or testimony.” 224 Agency organic

v. Epic Games, Inc., 917 F. Supp. 2d 503, 534 (E.D.N.C. 2012), aff’d on other grounds, 551 F.
App’x 646 (4th Cir. 2014).
219. Abraham Tabaie, Note, Protecting Privacy Expectations and Personal Documents in
SEC Investigations, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 781, 786 (2008).
220. AM. JUR. 2D Administrative Law, supra note 192, § 114.
221. 7 CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., WEST’S FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE § 7402 (3d
ed. 2001) (first citing United States v. Oncology Servs. Corp., 60 F.3d 1015, 1019 (3d Cir. 1995);
then citing NLRB v. Carolina Food Processors Inc., 81 F.3d 507, 511 (4th Cir. 1996); and then
citing EEOC v. Tire Kingdom, Inc., 80 F.3d 449, 451 (11th Cir. 1996)).
222. See 1 CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE § 3:14, Westlaw
(database updated Feb. 2020).
223. See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985). Because the Fourth Amendment
does not require a probable cause showing to make an inspection without consent, most investigative targets consent to inspections. Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 316 (1978)
(“[T]he great majority of businessmen can be expected in normal course to consent to inspection without warrant.”). Still, inspections may be more closely scrutinized than other requests
for information, and, in many circumstances, a warrant will be required. See KOCH, supra note
222, § 3:13.
224. OFF. OF LEGAL POL’Y, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 169, at 4.
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statutes sometimes provide only broad language that does not differentiate
among different subpoena types. For example, the FTCA confers power on
the FTC to “gather and compile information concerning, and to investigate
from time to time the organization, business, conduct, practices, and management of any . . . corporation,” and “[t]o require, by general or special orders, . . . corporations . . . to file with the Commission . . . reports or answers
in writing to specific questions.” 225 Ultimately, agency subpoena authorities
vary by (1) source and scope, (2) applicable enforcement mechanisms, (3)
notification provisions and other privacy protections, and (4) standards governing issuance. 226 Additionally, some statutes “limit or forbid delegation of
the authority [to issue subpoenas] to lower-ranking officials within the agency.” 227 The number of agency officials required to sign off on a subpoena
may also differ. 228
Despite their differences, visualizing all of the different private and public discovery tools in their entirety shows that there is significant overlap between them. That is, there are private analogues to many of the available
agency subpoena tools. Below, Table 1 explores this comparison:

225.
(b)).
226.
227.
228.

2 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, supra note 168, § 8.1 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 46(a)–
See OFF. OF LEGAL POL’Y, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 169, at 4.
Id. at 7 (footnote omitted).
Id.
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TABLE 1: COMPARISON OF ADMINISTRATIVE AND PRIVATE DISCOVERY
Admin. Subpoena Power 229

Private Discovery 230

Reporting Requirements 231

Initial Disclosures

Civil Investigatory Demands 232

No Analogue

Documents 233

Documents

Testimony or Depositions 234

Testimony or Depositions

Interrogatories 235

Interrogatories

Inspections 236

Property Inspections

No Analogue

Physical Examinations

No Analogue

Requests for Admissions

Forthwith Subpoena 237

No Analogue

The agency tools that have no private analogues tend to be aggressive
exercises of state power. For example:
•

Forthwith Subpoenas: A forthwith subpoena “direct[s] the person
to whom it is addressed to appear immediately either to testify or
bring subpoenaed items with him.” 238 It typically applies in the

229. See generally id. (providing a detailed review of the administrative subpoena powers
possessed by executive branch agencies).
230. FED. R. CIV. P. 26–36.
231. Reporting requirements are not part of an agency’s subpoena power but nonetheless
are comparable to automatic disclosures. See United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632
(1950).
232. See, e.g., 16 C.F.R. § 2.7 (2019) (authorizing CIDs in FTC investigations); 15 U.S.C.
§ 1312 (authorizing CIDs under the Antitrust Civil Process Act); 31 U.S.C. § 3733 (authorizing
the Attorney General to issue CIDs under the False Claims Act).
233. OFF. OF LEGAL POL’Y, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 169, at 6, 31.
234. See, e.g., 7 C.F.R. § 1.319 (2019) (concerning authority to conduct a hearing under
the Program Fraud Civil Remedies Act); 25 C.F.R. § 900.164 (2019) (likewise, under the Indian
Self-Determination and Education Act); 33 U.S.C. § 919(d) (Longshore and Harbor Worker’s
Compensation Act); 49 U.S.C. § 31133.
235. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 1204 (governing the Merits Systems Protection Board); False
Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3733.
236. See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. § 4555 (authorizing the Department of Energy to inspect premises to enforce the Defense Protection Act of 1950); 30 U.S.C. § 1211(c)(1) (authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to make “those investigations and inspections necessary” to ensure
compliance with the Surface Mining Control Reclamation Act of 1977).
237. See infra notes 238–240 and accompanying text.
238. CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL33321, ADMINISTRATIVE SUBPOENAS IN
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS 12 n.45 (2006).
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criminal investigation context. The SEC, for instance, has the
power to immediately seize documents, computer hard drives,
and digital devices without any ex ante notice, increasing the level
of disruption among regulated entities. 239 (The SEC’s Enforcement Manual counsels that forthwith subpoenas “should only be
used in exigent circumstances.” 240).
•

Civil Investigative Demands (CID): A CID, like a subpoena, is a
presuit device to compel production of documents, written responses to interrogatories, or sworn testimony. 241 One purpose of
a CID is to allow the government “to assess quickly, and at the
least cost to the taxpayers or to the party from whom information
is requested, whether grounds exist for initiating” suit. 242 Some
courts and agencies consider CIDs merely another form of subpoena unless a contrary intent is made clear. 243

On the whole, the similarities of tools and devices across the administrative and litigation states underlie their common purposes: to shape and
structure the behavior of regulated entities. And while there are significant
differences (more fully explored below), there are more similarities across
the two systems that support the legitimacy of broad discovery as an exercise
of delegated government power.
4.

Producer Pays and Costs

American discovery uniquely imposes the costs of production on the
producing party. 244 Under Rule 26, private plaintiffs can engage in broad discovery requests without any financial liability. This rule has generated an avalanche of commentary, some of it criticizing the rule for misaligning
239. Stephen Dockery, SEC’s Use of Rare ‘Forthwith’ Subpoena Raises Red Flags for Defense Counsel, MAIN JUSTICE: JUST ANTI-CORRUPTION (Nov. 7, 2013, 2:07 PM) (on file with the
Michigan Law Review); John Reed Stark, When to Say When: Handling Emerging TechnologyRelated SEC Enforcement Tactics, 45 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 37, at 1738–39 (Sept. 23,
2013).
240. OFF. OF CHIEF COUNS., SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N DIV. OF ENF’T, ENFORCEMENT
MANUAL
50
(2017),
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/enforcementmanual.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MMG5-XLYT].
241. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 3733(a). CIDs are often used by the FTC, the Antitrust Division
of the DOJ, and the Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division of the DOJ. MARK A. RUSH,
K&L GATES, CORPORATE RESPONSES TO INVESTIGATIVE REQUESTS BY THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT 8.
242. United States v. Markwood, 48 F.3d 969, 979 (6th Cir. 1995). See also H.R. REP. NO.
99-660, at 26 (1986) (stating a CID is a tool for the government “to determine whether enough
evidence exist[s] to warrant the expense of filing suit, as well as to prevent the potential defendant from being dragged into court unnecessarily”).
243. KOCH, supra note 222, § 3:12.
244. Redish & McNamara, supra note 2, at 774. The producer-pays presumption is
“largely an accident of history.” Gordon McKee, Anne Glover & Francis Rouleau, A Comparative Discussion of Who Pays for Document Discovery in Australia, Canada, Guernsey (Channel
Islands), and Singapore and its Effect on Access to Justice, 71 VAND. L. REV. 2145, 2147 (2018).
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incentives and allowing requesting parties to externalize the costs of their actions. 245 Critics have even accused this particular rule of fomenting gamesmanship and allowing parties to offensively impose crippling costs on
opposing parties to force settlement. 246 Like civil discovery, however, administrative subpoenas have always operated on the producer-pays rule. This
symmetry signals, again, that private discovery is serving an enforcement
agenda.
Administrative subpoena powers operate under a producer-pays rule
even though they can be exceptionally costly and disruptive. 247 For instance,
the SEC, FTC, EPA, and CFPB routinely demand significant document productions. 248 In this context, courts have developed a test that asks whether a
subpoena imposes an “undue burden.” Courts sometimes focus on the defendants’ resources, asking whether “the actual costs of discovery are unreasonable in light of the particular size of the respondent’s operations.” 249
Thus, for example, in NLRB v. AJD, Inc., the court enforced broad NLRB
subpoenas against McDonalds despite the fact that they imposed allegedly
“astronomical [costs]” of over “$1 million,” would “seriously disrupt their
business operations,” and sought “160,000 pages of documents,” and that
McDonalds’s maximum liability could not rise beyond $50,000. 250 The court
emphasized that the NLRB needed to investigate “labor violations at certain
McDonald’s franchises” and defendant had not shown a lack of capacity to
“handle the costs.” 251 Over the past few years the SEC has increasingly relied
“on broadly defined subpoenas instead of informal information requests.” 252
5.

Important Differences

Of course, administrative subpoena power also differs from discovery in
a variety of important and multifaceted ways. It is important not to understate these differences, which are, by some estimation, significant. Among
others, the differences between the two include the fact that administrative
subpoenas are issued prior to litigation while private discovery can only occur within litigation and that subpoena power is more expansive and varied
than private discovery. Perhaps these differences, and their underlying justification, emerge from the premise that private discovery is wielded by profitmotivated attorneys while subpoena power is a public tool that operates un245. See, e.g., Redish & McNamara, supra note 2, at 792.
246. E.g., Easterbrook, supra note 2, at 637.
247. Yaffe & Nowak, supra note 187, at 396.
248. Joseph T. Lynyak, III & Rebecca Tierney, Dealing with Civil Investigative Demands
from the CFPB: Rules, Responses, and Practice Considerations, 130 BANKING L.J. 771, 772–74
(2013).
249. NLRB v. AJD, Inc., No. 15 Misc. 326(JFK), 2015 WL 7018351, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov.
12, 2015).
250. Id.; Yaffe & Nowak, supra note 187, at 397.
251. AJD, Inc., 2015 WL 7018351, at *5.
252. Dockery, supra note 239.
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der political checks. Although courts have not explicitly recognized this political distinction, it seems evident from the case law that judges have implicitly incorporated it into their discovery calculus.
Courts treat administrative subpoenas as more legitimate and broader
than private discovery in many ways. For example, courts tolerate “fishing
expeditions” in the administrative context but not in private discovery. 253
Although administrative subpoena power “was once viewed with a great deal
of suspicion,” 254 this restrictive theory of administrative power was “rejected
many years ago, and ha[s] not been revived.” 255 Indeed, courts find that “official curiosity . . . [can be] ground for a[n] [agency] request for information.” 256 On the other hand, as Edson Sunderland recognized in 1932,
“[h]ostility to ‘fishing expeditions’ before trial is a traditional and powerful
taboo.” 257 And, despite evidence that Sunderland and the Rules drafters
sought to create a legal universe that “frequently seemed to require discovery
fishing expeditions,” 258 the taboo remains. 259
Courts’ acceptance of administrative fishing expeditions reflects their
perception that agency subpoena power is broader, more varied, and more
regularized than private discovery. The administrative subpoena is only one
of several tools agencies use in the ordinary course of their business to regulate private conduct, alongside recordkeeping and reporting requirements,
physical inspections, and the separate work of an agency’s Inspector General.
Unlike the discovery system, “an administrative investigation is a proceeding
distinct from any litigation that may eventually flow from it.” 260 In contrast,
even if judicial ex post review of discovery requests is broadly deferential to
both private and public regulators, discovery requests in private litigation are
still tethered to the lawsuit in which they appear. A lawsuit must be filed, and

253. See United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 641–54 (1950) (rejecting the argument that since “[t]he courts [sh]ould not go fishing,” neither should agencies). But compare
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947) (“No longer can the time-honored cry of ‘fishing
expedition’ serve to preclude a party from inquiring into the facts underlying his opponent’s
case.”), with McGee v. Hayes, 43 F. App’x 214, 217 (10th Cir. 2002) (arguing that district courts
are not “required to permit [a] plaintiff to engage in a ‘fishing expedition’ in the hope of supporting his claim”).
254. Campbell, supra note 15, at 398.
255. KOCH, supra note 222, § 3:10 (citing Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U.S.
501, 508–09 (1943), and Okla. Press Publ’g Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 214 (1946)).
256. AM. JUR. 2D Administrative Law, supra note 192, § 107.
257. Edson R. Sunderland, Foreword to GEORGE RAGLAND, JR., DISCOVERY BEFORE
TRIAL, at iii (1932).
258. Subrin, supra note 8, at 739. See generally id.
259. See, e.g., SEC v. Goldstone, 301 F.R.D. 593, 643 (D.N.M. 2014) (“[D]iscovery . . . is
not intended to be a fishing expedition . . . .”). See also Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Just Say “No
Fishing”: The Lure of Metaphor, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1, 3 (2006) (suggesting the legal profession reject the fishing metaphor).
260. Linde Thomson Langworthy Kohn & Van Dyke, P.C. v. Resolution Tr. Corp., 5 F.3d
1508, 1513 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
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motions litigated, before private discovery may begin to serve its regulatory
ends.
Despite the similarities discussed above, public discovery is also distinct
from private discovery in its diversity and scope. Whereas the Federal Rules
apply uniformly across federal courts (even if interpretation differs within
districts and circuits), agencies do not share the same subpoena power.
Moreover, because it exists outside litigation, an administrative subpoena
“may serve the full range of administrative processes,” 261 including conducting “investigations to make rules, to determine policy, to recommend legislation, and to illuminate areas in order to find out whether something should
be done and if so what.” 262 While the Article argues that private discovery
also serves these purposes, courts have mostly recognized these benefits in
the agency context only. Courts’ recognition of this investigative breadth reflects the thinking that “regulation c[annot] be intelligent unless the regulators ha[ve] access to information that only the regulated business could
supply.” 263
6.

The Democratic Legitimacy Problem

As previously discussed, when public officials exercise subpoena power
they enjoy a public and democratic check that private plaintiffs lack, creating
an obvious legitimacy gap between the two types of discovery. At first glance,
this appears to be a significant additional difference between the two types of
enforcement. But, as I discuss here, this asymmetry is not as important as
once thought and Congress may have already accounted for this difference.
Courts may implicitly accept wider administrative subpoenas because,
while plaintiffs’ attorneys are only motivated by profit, there is a political and
democratic check on agency officials. Scholars have long argued that while
public enforcers take social costs into account and exercise prosecutorial discretion, private enforcers are only willing to litigate for private gain and will
even file unmeritorious claims in search of settlement. 264 A plaintiff’s private
benefit could exceed the need for deterrence in a particular context, leading
to an excessive and inefficient number of lawsuits. 265 In this stylized view,
private enforcers can exploit broad discovery because there are no analogues
to the institutional and political constraints that agencies face. 266 Steven

261. KOCH, supra note 222, at § 3:12 (citing ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 68 (1947)).
262. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, supra note 168, § 8.1. See also Okla. Press Publ’g
Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946); United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642 (1950).
263. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, supra note 168, § 8.1.
264. See Shavell, supra note 124, at 577; Stephenson, supra note 13, at 116; cf. Engstrom,
supra note 24, at 630–34 (arguing that this zealousness critique of private enforcement is, “in
its full-throated form, overblown and indeterminate” but acknowledging that, “[a]s a firstorder generalization,” it has “much truth”).
265. Shavell, supra note 124, at 578.
266. Cf. Engstrom, supra note 24.
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Shavell, for instance, has argued that where private incentives to litigate exceed the social benefits that would result, restrictions should be implemented, including, notably, “procedural rules limiting discovery.” 267 Similarly,
Matthew Stephenson has argued that private suits—as compared to administrative enforcement—can lead to overenforcement, disrupt existing regulatory regimes, and “raise concerns about the democratic accountability of law
enforcers, since private plaintiffs are not subjected to the same electoral
checks that constrain executive officials.” 268 This “democratic accountability”
and “political check” critique has been at the center of private/public enforcement debates for at least two decades.
A recent spate of scholarship, however, has cast doubt on the significance of the democratic accountability problem and the political asymmetry
between private and public actors. 269 The fact that private enforcers are motivated by financial gain may not be a perverse incentive; it instead gives
plaintiffs’ attorneys a reason to be selective about the cases they choose to
bring, screening closely for worth and merit. William Hubbard, for instance,
argues that
[a] plaintiffs’ attorney working on contingency must offset the entire cost
of litigating every case with a fraction of the judgments in the successful
cases. This . . . magnifies the incentive to screen cases for quality . . . because the lawyer gets paid only if the plaintiff wins or obtains a settlement (both of which are more likely if the case is stronger). 270

To be sure, even this calculation leaves plenty of room for attorneys motivated by the possibility of settlement to bring “strike” or “nuisance” suits that
defendants can pay off. But the key is that private plaintiffs must invest time
and resources and are therefore at least partly disincentivized from filing
unmeritorious claims. 271 Plaintiffs’ firms are generally not paid by the hour
either, so they have no clear incentive to overrequest documents. 272
Plaintiffs’ financial motivation and other distortions are also not asymmetrical—they exist in the administrative state too. While the underlying assumption of the democratic-accountability critique is that public officials are
not financially motivated because they do not pocket damages awards, Margaret Lemos and Max Minzner have argued that public enforcers may seek
large monetary awards for self-interested reasons divorced from the public

267. Shavell, supra note 124, at 579.
268. Stephenson, supra note 13, at 114.
269. See, e.g., BRIAN T. FITZPATRICK, THE CONSERVATIVE CASE FOR CLASS ACTIONS 54–
55 (2019).
270. William H.J. Hubbard, A Fresh Look at Plausibility Pleading, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 693,
706–07 (2016).
271. Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Do Class Action Lawyers Make Too Little?, 158 U. PA. L. REV.
2043, 2070 n.118 (2010).
272. Richard Marcus, “Looking Backward” to 1938, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1691, 1712 (2014).

116

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 119:71

interest in deterrence. 273 This occurs most often when agencies can retain all
or some of the proceeds of enforcement; but even when they must turn over
their winnings to the general treasury, there are reputational reasons to focus
on and publicize dollars earned in judgments. 274 Agency heads have an interest in aggressive enforcement because it maximizes their agency’s budget,
and this interest is shared by lower-level employees because the benefits of a
larger budget trickle down to them through enhanced career opportunities. 275 In order to build up a reputation as an effective enforcer—in the eyes
of the legislature, executive officials, and judges—an agency will emphasize
easily measurable accomplishments, like large monetary awards in enforcement, rather than “more amorphous forms of success.” 276 High recoveries, in
an individual case or in the aggregate, can make an enforcement program
appear effective and might increase an agency’s autonomy from oversight. 277
An additional reason to question the alleged financial-motivation asymmetry is the long literature on the danger of agency capture and its distortive
consequences for enforcement. 278 All of this means that an agency’s costbenefit analysis is not optimal, as it is infected by reputational concerns and
financial motives and may reliably err on the side of action or overenforcement. 279
Accepting that both private and public enforcers face reputational consequences, it is unclear which of the two kinds of actors has better incentives.
For private plaintiffs, there may be costs to overfiling meritless claims in the
aggregate-litigation world, including potentially losing future clients. 280 Public enforcers, by contrast, may face little individual accountability for overbroad subpoenas and could potentially waste the massive resources of the
government. It’s therefore not as clear as it may first seem whether private or
public enforcers would be more likely to abuse the discovery process.
Not only do private and public enforcers face potentially negative financial and reputational incentives, Congress may have already accounted for
the lack of democratic legitimacy in private enforcement. As an initial matter, Congress, by choosing to arm individuals with private-enforcement
power, confers a modicum of democratic legitimacy on the process. 281 But
setting that aside, it appears that Congress writes statutes with greater speci-

273. Margaret H. Lemos & Max Minzner, For-Profit Public Enforcement, 127 HARV. L.
REV. 853, 856–57 (2014).
274. Id. at 854.
275. Id. at 870–71.
276. Id. at 876.
277. Id. at 877.
278. See, e.g., FITZPATRICK, supra note 269 at 171, n.79; David Freeman Engstrom, Harnessing the Private Attorney General: Evidence from Qui Tam Litigation, 112 COLUM. L. REV.
1244, 1263–64 (2012).
279. Lemos & Minzner, supra note 273, at 898.
280. See Bone, supra note 106, at 572.
281. Engstrom, supra note 24, at 638.
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ficity when granting primary enforcement and interpretive authority to individuals and courts, thus limiting potential “drift” by private enforcers. 282
Sean Farhang recently argued that Congress addresses the democratic legitimacy problem by “resolv[ing] more policy issues in the legislature, elaborating substantive statutory law in greater detail, and leverag[ing] more
administrative rulemaking expertise.” 283 This potentially mitigates the democratic legitimacy concern because “the actual state of the world is one in
which federal regulation implemented through litigation regimes is more informed by institutional policy-making capacity in the legislature, more often
attended by expert rulemaking, and more tied to democratic governance,
than previously thought.” 284
Finally, any remaining concerns over the democratic accountability deficit of private litigants are already implicitly addressed because the system
has built-in safeguards in the context of private enforcement that do not exist in public enforcement:
First, as discussed above, prior to broad discovery, plaintiffs must meet
the Twombly and Iqbal plausibility standard. This is a significant roadblock
that agencies do not face. Agencies can request information at any time
without meeting any pleading threshold. If pleading operates correctly, then
it is filtering all of the unmeritorious claims that agencies or bureaucrats
would not file.
Second, in recognition of agency democratic legitimacy, regulatory subpoenas can have much broader powers that a private plaintiff lacks. SEC officials, for example, can immediately seize documents or devices subject only
to an ex post judicial hearing. 285
Third, agency subpoenas are as a practical matter much more powerful
than private discovery because regulated entities have reputational and repeat-player reasons to maintain an amicable relationship with regulators.
Facing an agency subpoena, most regulated entities choose to cooperate rather than seek judicial review. 286 In the face of private complaints, by contrast, businesses have no reason not to seek judicial review and to challenge

282. Sean Farhang, Legislating for Litigation: Delegation, Public Policy, and Democracy,
106 CALIF. L. REV. 1529, 1534 (2018). Discovery as regulation also has implications for this literature. Scholars often describe the choice of private versus regulatory enforcement as a choice
between enforcement through the judiciary or agencies. See, e.g., Lemos, supra note 163, at 365;
Matthew C. Stephenson, Legislative Allocation of Delegated Power: Uncertainty, Risk, and the
Choice Between Agencies and Courts, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1035, 1038 (2006). This rich literature
sees private enforcement of statutes as delegation to courts and judges rather than bureaucrats.
But if discovery is the lynchpin of private enforcement and a truly regulatory tool, then private
enforcement is often not delegation to the judiciary but to private plaintiffs who operate under
little supervision and ultimately settle cases.
283. Farhang, supra note 282, at 1534.
284. Id. at 1602.
285. See Dockery, supra note 239.
286. See Stephen J. Choi & Adam C. Pritchard, SEC Investigations and Securities Class
Actions: An Empirical Comparison, 13 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 27, 28 (2016).

118

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 119:71

broad discovery requests. Administrative subpoenas are also more burdensome because, unlike in private discovery, parties cannot engage in reciprocal cost imposition. 287 Just like a plaintiff can force a defendant to bear the
costs of searching through thousands of emails, so can a defendant increase
costs by seeking expansive discovery of the plaintiff. 288 Both parties, then,
have an incentive to keep discovery within reasonable bounds lest it cause an
endless series of information requests. But this inherent limit does not exist
in the agency context where a regulated entity has no ability to impose costs
on regulators. Moreover, while courts have carved out exceptions to the producer-pays presumption, there doesn’t seem to be a similar development in
the agency context. 289
All of these differences seem to alleviate the apparent asymmetries between private discovery and administrative subpoena power and, regardless,
agency subpoenas enjoy an added weight that private enforcers lack—a difference that is justified by remaining democratic and institutional reasons to
trust agencies.
7.

The Diffusion Asymmetry

One final potential distinction between agency and private discovery is
that private enforcers are diffused, lack economies of scale, and can impose
redundant discovery costs on companies by filing hundreds or thousands of
uncoordinated lawsuits. Public enforcers, the argument goes, can avoid these
problems by concentrating regulation in single agencies or coordinating
across separate agencies. Bureaucrats also understand the underlying purposes of statutes and can therefore better decide when to expend organizational resources to file an enforcement claim. 290
This diffusion-redundancy critique misses the fact that a significant
amount of private enforcement takes place through aggregation devices like
class actions or multidistrict litigation. Whether in the context of antitrust,
civil rights, or securities litigation, the main (and sometimes only) enforcement tool for private plaintiffs is to proceed as a class or through MDLs.
Given that these devices often bind other plaintiffs through preclusion, private enforcers are partly limited from engaging in guerilla litigation. Aggregation also gives private plaintiffs economies of scale. In addition, discovery
can sometimes be expensive because of the time spent searching, gathering,
and preserving internal documents (including review by counsel). 291 So even
if multiple plaintiffs can file related claims with similar discovery requests,
287. See Lahav, supra note 89, at 2039–40.
288. Id. at 2040.
289. Jonathan Remy Nash & Joanna Shepherd, Aligning Incentives and Cost Allocation in
Discovery, 71 VAND. L. REV. 2015, 2017–22 (2018).
290. Cf. Engstrom, supra note 24, at 663–73 (comparing the institutional competences of
public versus private enforcers).
291. See William H.J. Hubbard, The Discovery Sombrero and Other Metaphors for Litigation, 64 CATH. U. L. REV. 867, 889–90 (2015).
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they are likely not imposing redundant costs—a regulated entity needs only
to produce documents it has already searched and gathered in response to
prior requests. This casts doubt on the costly redundancy critique of private
enforcement.
Private enforcers also have a potentially significant advantage in the
context of discovery: they are often “organizational insiders” with better incentives and knowledge of what information is relevant. 292 Administrative
agencies must constantly solicit information from regulated entities, issue
subpoenas or investigative demands, and stay acquainted with their industries because they are one step removed from regulated entities. They are
outsiders to the process. Private litigants, by contrast, are often insiders: employees, consumers, and competitors. They can understand better than any
agency whether a competitor, employer, or manufacturer is violating a statute. 293 We may thus expect ex ante that their discovery requests might be
more targeted than those of agencies. If we are worried about costs, this may
justify empowering private rather than public enforcers with discovery.
*

*

*

Taking all of these similarities together, and acknowledging existing significant differences, it is not difficult to see discovery as a regulatory device
intertwined with private and public enforcement. Both agencies and private
plaintiffs inevitably need information that only regulated entities hold. Consequently, some of our most important statutory regimes depend on private
litigants who can obtain broad information from regulated entities. Discovery in these areas operates as a regulatory tool.
C. Regulatory Discovery’s Spillover Effects
Once we reconceptualize one of discovery’s roles as regulation, many of
its features become easier to understand. At the core of regulatory discovery
is neither fairness, nor accuracy, nor judicial economy, nor equality. Rather,
regulatory discovery seeks to promote deterrence of harmful behavior and
aims to shape the primary behavior of regulated entities to achieve better
compliance with existing laws and norms. In this sense, discovery has positive spillover effects—social rather than private benefits—that go beyond
each specific case and can shape regulated entities’ behavior, expose wrong-

292. See Engstrom, supra note 24, at 632; Myriam E. Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform Litigation: Deputizing Private Citizens in the Enforcement of Civil Rights, 100 COLUM. L.
REV. 1384, 1387 (2000); cf. KUO-CHANG HUANG, INTRODUCING DISCOVERY INTO CIVIL LAW
40–44 (2003) (comparing the factfinding incentives of judges in civil law jurisdictions against
those of litigants in common law jurisdictions).
293. See Effron, supra note 110, at 142 (“The [discovery rules assume] that the parties
themselves are in the best position to know and negotiate how much discovery is needed, what
materials fall within the scope of discovery, and when and where discovery events should take
place.”).
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doing, and influence industry-wide practices and the development of substantive law.
While our current discovery paradigm is well armed to recognize discovery’s negative spillovers—providing tools like protective orders or motions to seal the record—what it lacks is a vocabulary, underlying theory, and
proper tools to recognize positive spillovers. So while it is undoubtedly difficult or perhaps impossible to measure whether regulatory discovery is systemically optimal, this Section’s goal is to argue that discovery can operate as
regulation that produces broad and positive effects that we currently undervalue.
One benefit that gains more prominence within a regulatory-discovery
paradigm is deterrence, which has long been one of the main justifications
for private enforcement. The logic is simple: the threat of a lawsuit from a
plaintiff with broad investigatory powers, and the prospect of lawyers examining internal documents and witnesses, should dissuade regulated entities
from violating the law. To be sure, identifying discovery’s incremental deterrent value is a challenging and a nearly “imponderable” question. 294 But for
our purposes we need only understand that discovery can promote both specific deterrence—by ensuring that a defendant’s misdeeds are exposed—and
general deterrence—by increasing the costs of litigation and changing the
probability of success at trial. 295 Indeed, discovery’s investigatory role may be
the most important aspect of litigation deterrence. Discovery can uniquely
increase the probability of exposing wrongdoing. Neither class actions nor
pleading standards can do that. In that sense, information exchange practices can have considerable influence on the cost-benefit analyses of regulated
entities. If deterrence is at the heart of discovery, then discovery costs that
are even higher than the cost of the lawsuit can be justified when they create
sufficient deterrence “that leads actors to take steps to reduce injuries by an
amount that exceeds the costs of the lawsuit.” 296
Discovery’s regulatory and deterrent effect is broad and can be conceptualized by its influence on (1) primary behavior, (2) transparency, and (3)
the substantive law. While I recognize the possibility of (4) negative spillovers, I argue that we already have sufficient tools to address or limit their
consequences.

294. Bruce L. Hay, Civil Discovery: Its Effects and Optimal Scope, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 481,
483 (1994).
295. See Jonah B. Gelbach & Bruce H. Kobayashi, The Law and Economics of Proportionality in Discovery, 50 GA. L. REV. 1093, 1100–02 (2016); cf. Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Do Class Actions Deter Wrongdoing?, in THE CLASS ACTION EFFECT 181 (Catherine Piché ed., 2018)
(explaining how class actions help bad actors internalize costs to provide specific and general
deterrence).
296. Jay Tidmarsh, The Litigation Budget, 68 VAND. L. REV. 855, 861 & n.18 (2015) (citing Shavell, supra note 124, at 585).
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Discovery and Primary Behavior: The Disney, Faragher, and Argentina
Cases

Discovery can influence, change, or structure the primary behavior of
regulated entities. This effect is most clear in the context of corporate litigation. In a broad study of corporate law, Érica Gorga and Michael Halberstam
found that “modern discovery . . . has had a profound impact on the evolution of shareholder litigation, corporate governance, and the culture of corporate disclosure in the United States.” 297 Discovery has not only been a
powerful tool for plaintiffs’ attorneys but has also restructured corporate expectations and the way that companies collect and produce information. Litigation over corporate decisions can smoke out internal emails, accounting
techniques, records, and employee secrets (in depositions). 298 Vast amounts
of corporate information thus expose companies’ internal decisionmaking
and force them to change methods in order to comply with routine discovery requests. 299 Gorga and Halberstam argue that “episodic legal demands
for detailed corporate internal information have induced incremental improvements in corporate governance practices, including more exacting decision procedures, internal monitoring, recordkeeping, and securities disclodisclosure.” 300
Even more, discovery has influenced how companies conduct internal
investigations and has produced information that has directly shaped new
regulations. 301 For example, the discovery that followed scandals such as Enron uncovered facts regarding internal corporate malfeasance that informed
ensuing statutes and regulatory reforms. 302 Discovery produced in this scandal shaped the SEC’s new compensation rules. 303 Gorga and Halberstam
highlight how in one particular case against Disney (where the company was
found not liable), discovery resulted in over nine thousand pages of transcripts, business records, and correspondence that forced the Board to dismiss the CEO and completely reform their governance structure. 304
Analyzing this case from a purely adversarial angle would paint discovery as
a giant waste. But from the regulatory point of view, discovery was wildly
successfully. For one, discovery allowed the court to “articulate[] new standards of fiduciary duty in board decision-making” that would inform other
companies—an otherwise difficult endeavor. 305 These kinds of decisions also

297. Gorga & Halberstam, supra note 13, at 1386.
298. Id. at 1453–54.
299. Id.
300. Id. at 1395.
301. See generally id.
302. Id. at 1396.
303. Id. at 1427.
304. Id. at 1401–06; see also In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693 (Del.
Ch. 2005), aff’d, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).
305. Gorga & Halberstam, supra note 13, at 1427.
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allow lawyers “to get their clients to accept better conduct and procedures,” 306 and can have a disciplinary effect by “forc[ing] managers to answer
questions they do not want to answer,” and “challeng[ing] their power and
authority in a public setting.” 307
Discovery has the potential to lead to both internal reforms and industry-wide reforms. Internally, companies engage in “introspection through
litigation,” by reviewing information produced in lawsuits “to better understand weaknesses in personnel, training, management, and policies.” 308 This
is particularly useful in large and complex organizations where information
is “decentralized and held by a number of different people and entities.” 309
One anecdote from a legal-profession study captures discovery’s potential as
a vehicle for internal reform: “A litigation partner in a New York firm told us
that in the course of defending a product liability action, he learned facts that
led him to seek out the company’s chief executive officer to tell him that the
corporate product safety and quality control systems ‘were a mess.’ ” 310
As Joanna Schwartz has argued, “[f]or organizations interested in learning about their performance, lawsuits are, in essence, unsolicited audits by
deeply dissatisfied customers who are highly motivated.” 311 These “audits”
are—in the language of regulatory discovery—a private version of an agency
audit. For example, in the airline context, investigations and reporting requirement by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) lead to regular
changes among airlines. 312 But lawsuits complement this regulation in areas
that the FAA otherwise does not cover. 313 Discovery has played a similarly
complementary regulatory role in the realms of car-manufacturing defects,
aircraft accidents, and hospital malpractice. 314 So, just like an FAA bureaucrat or lawyer can force regulated companies to reform their behavior, both a
company’s own lawyers as well as opposing counsel can use discovery to uncover internal information that leads to corporate reform.
But discovery’s effects are not cabined to internal reform of the single
company in litigation—they also inform external decisions by management

306. Id. (internal quotation omitted).
307. Id. at 1429.
308. Schwartz, Introspection Through Litigation, supra note 13, at 1055–56 (footnote
omitted).
309. Id. at 1060.
310. Robert A. Kagan & Robert Eli Rosen, On the Social Significance of Large Law Firm
Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 399, 432 (1985).
311. Schwartz, Introspection Through Litigation, supra note 13, at 1057–58. See also
Schwartz, A Dose of Reality, supra note 13, at 1283 (“[L]awsuits can be a useful tool for auditing the effectiveness of . . . hospital data sources.”).
312. Schwartz, Introspection Through Litigation, supra note 13, at 1063.
313. Id. at 1063, 1063 n.32 (considering, for instance, injuries from turbulence and emergency descents that have not been found in National Transportation Safety Board and FAA
reports “and so may only come to an airline’s attention when described in a lawsuit” (footnote
omitted)).
314. Id. at 1062–70.
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in other companies. 315 This extraordinary transparency affects companies’
reputations and internal behavior and has arguably bolstered U.S. financial
markets and corporate behavior. In a recent study of sovereign debt litigation, Sadie Blanchard found that creditors often complain that the system is
flawed because debtor states are almost never forced to pay outstanding
debt. 316 Nonetheless, market actors repeatedly claim to value this kind of litigation. Why? Because, among other things, discovery in sovereign debt cases
reveals information about states’ credit-worthiness, “mitigate[s] information
asymmetries about debtor behavior,” and shapes reputational governance
and market decisions by third parties. 317 The key to courts’ role in these cases
is not their power to bind their parties or ultimately resolve the case; it is instead that they can force states to reveal information that “other reputationshaping institutions do not provide and that matters to investors and other
third parties with sanctioning power.” 318 In one case against Argentina, U.S.
creditors used discovery to reveal corruption schemes around the world,
which then influenced the debt market, prosecutors, and newspapers. 319 In
these cases, discovery updates, shapes, and reorganizes the market—it regulates.
Cases do not need to have a high amount in controversy in order for regulatory discovery to serve its purposes. In the seminal case Faragher v. City
of Boca Raton, a former city lifeguard sued her employer and the city for
sexual harassment under Title VII, a provision that relies on private enforcement. 320 Plaintiff requested only nominal, compensatory, and punitive
damages of unnamed amounts but likely in the tens of thousands of dollars. 321 Nonetheless, extensive discovery produced a formidable record that
the city had failed to publicize its sexual harassment policy among employees, track the conduct of supervisors, or create a reasonable process for handling sexual harassment complaints. 322 Documents and depositions also
painstakingly detailed Boca Raton’s internal hierarchy, supervision standards, hiring and personnel practices, facilities, and internal memoranda. 323
After the Court sided with the plaintiff against the city, and explicitly questioned the city’s sexual harassment policy, details produced in the case became the basis for a revolution in employment and personnel practices. State
governments, cities, and employers developed new comprehensive sexual

315. Id.
316. Sadie Blanchard, Courts as Information Intermediaries: A Case Study of Sovereign
Debt Disputes, 2018 BYU L. REV. 497.
317. Id. at 503.
318. Id. at 531.
319. Id. at 542–43; see also NML Cap. Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 2:14-cv-492RFB-VCF, 2014 WL 3898021 (D. Nev. Aug. 11, 2014).
320. 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
321. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 864 F. Supp. 1552, 1568 (S.D. Fla. 1994).
322. Id. at 1559–60.
323. Id. at 1557–58.
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harassment policies, dissemination processes, harassment training, comprehensive background checks, and policies for reviewing supervisory actions. 324 Discovery, and a bench trial, in Faragher led to an array of reforms.
2.

Discovery, Transparency, and Public Benefits

Discovery exposes wrongdoing to the public eye, securities market, and
regulators, reinforcing reputational consequences for regulated entities. Litigation has public effects beyond a judicial finding of liability. By concentrating public attention on alleged wrongdoing, “litigation can and frequently
does inflict nonlegal harms on defendants such as harm to their reputations.” 325
Discovery is at the center of this reputation effect because it is the mechanism by which internal records and decisions can become public during litigation. 326 Courts have traditionally recognized that access to court
proceedings and documents is presumptively public. 327 But most discovery
takes place outside court, 328 so it is not part of the “public trial.” The public
ordinarily can access key litigation documents and depositions only when
one of the parties chooses to share them 329 or they are “used in [a court] proceeding.” 330 Moreover, a party seeking to restrict the other parties in litigation from receiving discovery or distributing received discovery may do so

324. Susan Bisom-Rapp, Essay, Sex Harassment Training Must Change: The Case for Legal Incentives for Transformative Education and Prevention, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 62, 67
(2018); David Sherwyn, Michael Heise & Zev J. Eigen, Don’t Train Your Employees and Cancel
Your “1-800” Harassment Hotline: An Empirical Examination and Correction of the Flaws in
the Affirmative Defense to Sexual Harassment Charges, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1265, 1300–01
(2001); Elizabeth C. Tippett, Harassment Trainings: A Content Analysis, 39 BERKELEY J. EMP. &
LAB. L. 481, 508–510 (2018).
325. Russell M. Gold, Compensation’s Role in Deterrence, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1997,
2007–23 (2016) (footnote omitted).
326. Cf. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Grady, 594 F.2d 594, 596 (7th Cir. 1978) (“[P]retrial discovery must take place in the public unless compelling reasons exist for denying the public access to the proceedings.” (citation omitted)). But see Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S.
20, 34 (1984) (“Liberal discovery is provided for the sole purpose of assisting in the preparation
and trial, or the settlement, of litigated disputes.”).
327. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 n.17 (1980)
(“[H]istorically both civil and criminal trials have been presumptively open.”); Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and Public Access to the Courts, 105 HARV. L. REV. 427,
428–29 (1991) (discussing the historical roots of the right to access).
328. FED. R. CIV. P. 5(d)(1)(A) (“[D]iscovery requests and responses must not be filed
until they are used in the proceeding or the court orders filing . . . .”).
329. ROBERT TIMOTHY REAGAN, FED. JUD. CTR., CONFIDENTIAL DISCOVERY: A POCKET
GUIDE ON PROTECTIVE ORDERS 2 & n.3 (2012), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2012
/ConfidentialDisc.pdf [https://perma.cc/2529-M9ND] (“Certainly the public has no right to
demand access to discovery materials which are solely in the hands of private party litigants.”
(quoting Pub. Citizen v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 858 F.2d 775, 780 (1st Cir. 1988))).
330. FED. R. CIV. P. 5(d)(1)(A).
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through a protective order (discussed further infra in Section IV.C.5). 331 Absent a protective order, parties can distribute or use information exchanged
in discovery for any legal purpose. 332 And in some cases, attorneys and the
press have simply disregarded protective orders and leaked important discovery material. 333 This means that there are a variety of avenues by which
discovery information reaches the public: open court proceedings, documents attached to summary judgment motions or other filings, deliberate
sharing by parties, document leaks, and dissemination by Rule 24 intervenors (often the press).
A recent spate of scholars has recognized that discovery can produce
“social benefits” by forcing regulated entities to produce information of public consequence that shapes reputations. 334 For instance, Maria Correia and
Michael Klausner found in an empirical analysis of securities class actions
that “CEOs, CFOs and other officers often lose their jobs in the wake of class
actions and thus bear those costs.” 335 Those reputational consequences are
influenced by detailed information on executives’ actions produced in discovery. Prior studies of securities-fraud cases have even found that classaction filings have an immediate impact on share prices because of the potential discovery of fraud. 336 As mentioned above, other studies have also
found that sovereign debt markets are shaped by litigation involving debtor
states.
Courts have similarly emphasized the importance of discovery in producing information relevant for public welfare. 337 Congress has even consid331. Id. 26(c)(1); see also REAGAN, supra note 329, at 2–3. For a further discussion on
protective orders, see infra Section IV.C.3.
332. See, e.g., Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 35 (1984). Third-party access to
discovery—mainly by the media—under Rule 24 is another essential avenue of information.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 24; see also, e.g., Pub. Citizen v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 858 F.2d 775, 784-87 (1st
Cir. 1988); Richard P. Campbell, The Protective Order in Products Liability Litigation: Safeguard or Misnomer?, 31 B.C. L. REV. 771, 810 (1990) (discussing Public Citizen’s attempt to
secure Rule 24 intervenor status to challenge the modification of a protective order in the
Agent Orange litigation).
333. William G. Childs, When the Bell Can’t Be Unrung: Document Leaks and Protective
Orders in Mass Tort Litigation, 27 REV. LITIG. 565, 566 (2008).
334. See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 13, at 98–105; Lytton, supra note 13, at 1843–58; Wagner, supra note 13, at 711–27.
335. Maria Correia & Michael Klausner, Are Securities Class Actions “Supplemental” to
SEC Enforcement? An Empirical Analysis, EUR. FIN. MGMT. ASS’N 4 (June 2013),
https://www.efmaefm.org/0EFMAMEETINGS/EFMA%20ANNUAL%20MEETINGS/2013Reading/papers/EFMA2013_0593_fullpaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/5PMW-NX63].
336. Choi & Pritchard, supra note 286, at 27. Contra Joseph A. Grundfest, Disimplying
Private Rights of Action Under the Federal Securities Laws: The Commission’s Authority, 107
HARV. L. REV. 963, 973 n.36 (1994).
337. See, e.g., Chi. Council of Laws. v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 258 (7th Cir. 1975)
(“[C]ertain civil suits may be instigated for the very purpose of gaining information for the
public.”); Richard Marcus, Bomb Throwing, Democratic Theory, and Basic Values—A New
Path to Procedural Harmonization?, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 475, 477–78 (2013). Scholars have also
advocated litigation’s information-flushing function in several areas of tort law. See, e.g., Wen-
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ered bills to limit the issuance of protective orders where discovery is related
to public health. 338 Examples abound in the employment discrimination
context, wage claims under the FLSA, civil enforcement of RICO claims, and
sexual discrimination. 339 For instance, in Barcume v. City of Flint, evidence
of widespread sexual harassment only became public during discovery in a
separate claim for sexual discrimination. 340 Although outside the scope of
the Article, the torts context is again informative here. One recent example is
a mass torts lawsuit against Monsanto over its herbicide, Roundup, where
plaintiffs’ attorneys publicized “hundreds of company emails obtained
through discovery,” that showed a potential link between Roundup and cancer. 341 Although such information can be strategically deployed by plaintiffs’
attorneys to force settlement, it can often amplify accurate information with
effects on social welfare. 342
3.

Discovery’s Other Positive Spillovers

As a result of the two effects discussed above, discovery has other positive spillovers that are unrelated to the specific case at hand—such as
prompting changes in substantive law. Discovery increases the amount of
public information about regulated entities, allowing system designers to
update, improve, and even develop new regulations. 343 As Jack Friedenthal
once argued, “over the years developments in areas such as . . . employment
discrimination[] and consumer protection have been the result at least partly
of broad-ranging discovery provisions.” 344 The Supreme Court even justified
changes to employment discrimination law—forcing plaintiffs to show actu-

dy Wagner, Stubborn Information Problems & the Regulatory Benefits of Gun Litigation, in
SUING THE GUN INDUSTRY: A BATTLE AT THE CROSSROADS OF GUN CONTROL AND MASS
TORTS 271, 271 (Timothy D. Lytton ed., 2005) (gun control); Engstrom, supra note 10, at 328–
35 (auto); Rabin, supra note 13, at 302 (asbestos, tobacco, and medical instruments); Joanna C.
Schwartz, What Police Learn from Lawsuits, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 841, 890 (2012) (police misconduct). But see A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Uneasy Case for Product Liability,
123 HARV. L. REV. 1437, 1473 (2010) (suggesting there is little evidence that product liability
suits have enhanced product safety for aircrafts, automobiles, and the DPT vaccine).
338. Richard L. Marcus, Retooling American Discovery for the Twenty-First Century: Toward a New World Order?, 7 TUL. J. INT’L & COMPAR. L. 153, 180 (1999).
339. See supra Section III.A.
340. See Barcume v. City of Flint, 819 F. Supp. 631, 637 (E.D. Mich. 1993) (disallowing an
amended complaint adding sexual harassment claims after discovery).
341. Jacob Bunge & Ruth Bender, Roundup, the World’s Best-Selling Weedkiller, Faces a
Legal Reckoning, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 8, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/roundup-theweedkiller-that-changed-farming-faces-a-reckoning-11554735900 (on file with the Michigan
Law Review).
342. But see Richard L. Marcus, A Modest Proposal: Recognizing (at Last) that the Federal
Rules Do Not Declare that Discovery Is Presumptively Public, 81 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 331 (2006)
(arguing against a default rule that discovery information is public).
343. Marcus, supra note 4, at 749.
344. Friedenthal, supra note 122, at 818.
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al cause—by highlighting the availability of discovery. 345 By generating new
methods of enforcing statutes, plaintiffs’ attorneys can become engines of
legal reform and can engender support for new legislation or judicial decisions. 346
4.

Discovery’s Negative Spillovers

Of course, discovery can also generate negative spillovers and significant
systemic costs. But the system has built a series of safeguards to keep those
negative effects in check. So while courts and existing doctrines seem to lack
an underlying recognition of discovery’s positive spillovers—and a theory to
support them—the system already accounts for the costs or negative effects
side of the ledger.
There is an extensive literature highlighting discovery’s potential to
force unfair settlements, deter socially beneficial behavior, and eliminate trials. 347 Even setting aside cost asymmetries between plaintiffs and defendants,
regulatory discovery may also expose companies to public relations fiascos
via revelations of perfectly legal behavior. For example, tort law obligates
companies to adopt only those safety measures whose costs are justified by
their social impact; companies may calculate the potential loss of life or injuries and nonetheless proceed with their corporate activities. 348 It is perhaps
concerning that companies fearful of future discovery may balk at doing
anything that even appears inappropriate to the public eye. Widespread deterrence of socially beneficial behavior could ensue. We may worry, too, that
once negative spillovers are tallied and added to the costs of litigation that
would mount if we embrace broad discovery, we risk reverting to an unclear
view of discovery as regulation.
Moreover, there are important caveats regarding all of the positive spillover benefits discussed above. First, in Disney, Faragher, and similar cases,
regulatory discovery is not operating on its own. The high costs of litigation
and reputational consequences—rather than the pure production of internal
information—can also spur deterrence and internal corporate reforms.
Companies grudgingly change arrangements and even fire executives because it helps to reduce the occurrence or cost of future lawsuits. It’s unclear
how much of this we should attribute to discovery. To be sure, trial remains
an important avenue, and sometimes the only avenue, for the benefits of discovery to become truly transparent. But it is often the process of discovery,
not trial, that does the hard work of getting parties to produce information.
345. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 657–58 (1989); Tex. Dep’t of
Cmty. Affs. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 258 (1981); see also Marcus, supra note 4, at 751 (arguing
from these cases that “the very structure of employment discrimination law seems to have been
founded partly on the availability of broad discovery”).
346. Friedenthal, supra note 122, at 818.
347. See supra Part II.
348. See generally Gary T. Schwartz, The Myth of the Ford Pinto Case, 43 RUTGERS L.
REV. 1013, 1037 (1991).
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Second, there are surely many examples where a defendant absorbs the costs
of regulatory discovery and, unlike the Disney case, there is no corresponding private and social gain.
But these negative spillovers and caveats are not only well recognized in
the literature; courts and Congress have also built a bevy of tools to deal with
these problems. Parties can move for a protective order under Rule 26(c)—
even if the information is relevant and proportional—that would require
“that a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial information not be revealed or be revealed only in a specified way.” 349
The Advisory Committee notes explicitly that “courts have recognized that
interests in privacy may call for a measure of extra protection.” 350 Parties can
move to seal produced records, 351 quash overbroad or unduly burdensome
subpoenas, 352 designate matters as privileged or work product, 353 and otherwise stipulate to keep information confidential. 354 If anything, there is some
suggestive evidence that courts are granting protective orders too often. 355
This demonstrates that the system already accounts for the possibility of
negative spillovers and that what is missing is a better set of tools, theory,
and vocabulary to recognize and promote positive spillovers, especially regulatory ones. One upshot of the regulatory theory of discovery is that a good
measure of public availability may be necessary in order to achieve general
deterrence.
D. The Intersection of Private and Public Discovery
Private discovery and public enforcement have come to intersect in a variety of ways, further reinforcing the view that discovery could be conceptualized as a regulatory tool. At the heart of their intersection is piggyback
litigation—situations where private or public enforcers ride the coattails of
previous enforcement by filing claims after an action has been filed or resolved. 356
Government enforcement cases have the potential to generate vast
amounts of discovery that private enforcers can employ, lowering costs and

349. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1)(G).
350. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b) advisory committee’s note to 1970 amendment.
351. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c).
352. FED. R. CIV. P. 45(d)(3).
353. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5).
354. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c).
355. Endo, supra note 107, at 1299.
356. Zachary D. Clopton, Redundant Public-Private Enforcement, 69 VAND. L. REV. 285,
288 (2016) (“The Chamber of Commerce, no friend to the plaintiffs’ bar, has championed environmental citizen suits over EPA intervention.”); Howard M. Erichson, Coattail Class Actions: Reflections on Microsoft, Tobacco, and the Mixing of Public and Private Lawyering in
Mass Litigation, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 2 (2000).
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expanding the breadth of information available. 357 Although there are significant privacy and trade-secret limits, a considerable amount of information
produced in litigation against the government is inherently public. That information can become extremely useful to other litigants with overlapping or
redundant private claims. For example, in the midst of litigation against tobacco companies in the 1990s, the state of Minnesota “established a publicly
accessible document depository containing over 35 million pages discovered
in its lawsuit.” 358 Private plaintiffs then seized this information to build their
own individual and class action cases against tobacco companies. 359 This
borrowing dramatically reduced litigation costs in follow-on litigation.
The obverse is also true—private enforcement can shed light on wrongdoing and therefore spur public regulatory action. Given that public regulators lack a functional panopticon, they often rely on signals from private
plaintiffs and class actions to understand areas that need further public enforcement. A CFPB study identified hundreds of instances where public enforcement followed private actions and drew from their strategies. 360 For exexample, in the analogous mass torts context, private claims against faulty
Firestone Tires triggered action by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. 361 Private discovery is crucial in these cases.
Setting aside information produced during litigation, some private litigants can also have access to information produced to agencies during administrative investigations. In the PSLRA context, where discovery is limited
during a pending motion to dismiss, courts have nonetheless allowed discovery over information that has already been produced to the SEC. 362 This
has created an opening where private litigants can interact with agencies to
amass necessary information in securities cases. Courts have allowed this
under the theory that defendants suffer no undue burden or costs in producing information that they have already provided to government entities. 363
Although producing entities often claim that documents are privileged,
courts have refused to accept that theory. 364 Indeed, the Financial Industry
Regulatory Authority has gone as far as to provide guidance on the discoverability of financial documents produced to agencies.
357. The SEC actually discusses in its manual whether information obtained in investigations can be used by its own staff during litigation. See OFF. OF CHIEF COUNS., SEC. & EXCH.
COMM’N DIV. OF ENF’T, supra note 240.
358. Erichson, supra note 356, at 11.
359. Id. at 11–12.
360. Clopton, supra note 356, at 298.
361. See Michael L. Rustad, Smoke Signals from Private Attorneys General in Mega Social
Policy Cases, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 511, 518 (2001).
362. See e.g., In re LaBranche Sec. Litig., 333 F. Supp. 2d 178, 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
363. Id. at 183; Howard S. Suskin & Joseph H. Thompson, Discovery Stays Under the
PSLRA, SEC. LITIG. J., Fall 2007.
364. LaMorte v. Mansfield, 438 F.2d 448, 451 (2d Cir. 1971); Philip M. Aidikoff, Robert
A. Uhl, Ryan K. Bakhtiari & Jeff Aidikoff, Discovery of Regulatory Documents: Debunking the
Myth of an “SEC Privilege” in Securities Arbitration, 18 PIABA B.J. 187 (2011).
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IV. A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR REGULATORY DISCOVERY
This Part turns to the implications of reconceptualizing discovery as a
device with multiple underlying justifications, including an important regulatory rationale. The analysis attempts to answer the question of how courts
should exercise their supervisory powers over discovery to fully engage with
its complexity. Specifically, this Part addresses three domains: categorizing
discovery disputes, understanding the relevance of costs, and grappling with
regulatory discovery. Moving through these three domains elucidates a set of
principles and tradeoffs that can guide judges in addressing discovery models. The analysis is not necessarily practical; it is also abstract and ignores
several other important axes of dispute (confidentiality, trade secrets, etc.).
The goal, however, is not to generate a comprehensive guide. Rather, it is to
map some preliminary lines of analysis and offer some theoretical insights
that can apply in real-world disputes.
A. Discovery is a Plural Device
When judges intervene in discovery disputes, they must first understand
the needs of the case and the relevant relationship between the substantive
law and the specific discovery requests at issue. But, in order to answer this
preliminary question, the theories developed above counsel that discovery is
a plural device with multiple justifications and both individual and systemic
implications. Its background theories sometimes overlap and sometimes
point in different directions. But we cannot even begin to ask questions
about discovery costs or breadth without first understanding which theory of
discovery we are invoking. For discovery seeks to accomplish many ends that
are moral, historical, economical, and institutional. The difficulty therefore
lies in understanding when, exactly, these theories intersect and when they
do not and then using that as a launchpad to reform the discovery system.
Let’s begin with an understanding of why these discovery theories operate at different levels—some systemic and some individual. Fairness and
equality are primarily concerned with the specific facts of the case and
whether plaintiffs can obtain information that will allow them to build a legal case, gain a voice in front of a judge, and reach an accurate outcome. Participation values are, of course, more systemic. But the goal of any equitable
discovery system is to make plaintiffs feel as if they received a fair shake in
the legal system. Contrast that with the historical and economic idea of discovery as a way to narrow trial or make it redundant, which operates at both
the individual and systemic level. But the core of discovery as a tool to narrow trials and promote settlement is mainly institutional—the role of discovery is to limit the inefficient jury and trial process.
Regulatory discovery, by contrast, is only systemic. Return, for example,
to the Disney case where shareholders sued the board over executive pay. At
the end of a case that produced large amounts of documents and depositions, Disney was found not liable. In hindsight, from a fairness point of
view, it was neither efficient nor equitable to subject Disney to that amount
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of discovery. Nor did the costs force the parties to settle. Discovery seems
wasteful under those two theories. But regulatory discovery is only concerned with the effects of the case on the corporate law, deterrence, costbenefit analyses of peer companies, and exposure of wrongdoing. By that
measure, discovery was wildly successful because it led to significant improvements by the SEC and the practices of in-house lawyers in peer firms.
FIGURE 1
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This systemic versus individual difference also highlights the complex
relationship with accuracy among these theories. A fairness justification is
concerned mainly with accuracy and participation—broad discovery is appropriate because it maximizes the amount of information available to the
factfinder and gives parties a voice and ability to construct a case. By contrast, an equality justification is meant not to give parties a voice but rather
to help litigants overcome the asymmetries inherent between plaintiffs and
defendants and one-shotters and repeat players. These goals are also related
to accuracy, but they can stand on their own; we may want equality for
equality’s sake. Where these asymmetries do not exist, as in business-tobusiness cases where parties have considerable information—e.g., a dispute
over the meaning of a contractual term—then fairness may nonetheless
promote broad discovery, but equality would not. Similarly, an extremely
expensive discovery process in a civil rights or employment discrimination
case may not be justified under the efficiency prong of the fairness justification but may nonetheless be supported by a concern for equality. Discovery’s
role as a settlement inducer is not overly concerned with accuracy; the goal is
instead to limit another process (trials) for efficiency reasons. Finally, regulatory discovery is not closely related to accuracy (at least at the case level) at
all. It is focused entirely on broader deterrence.
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Interestingly, in both the trial-substitution and regulatory theories, discovery stands in for something else, either common law trials or enforce-

132

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 119:71

ment. This common thread connects these two theories and highlights that
discovery is simply a tool that fulfills broader systemic and institutional
goals.
B. Costs Reconsidered: Absolute Versus Relative Costs
With the four foundational discovery theories in view, the question of
costs becomes radically different from that usually asked by courts and
scholars. Recall that over the past four decades, discovery debates have centered on cost, 365 usually defined as the money spent in litigation. 366 Thus,
although Rule 26(b) allows judges to consider six factors in assessing discovery requests 367—of which “the monetary stakes are only one,” as the Advisory Committee takes pains to note 368—scholars and judges tend to analyze
discovery costs relative to the potential award in a particular case. 369 As
Judge Marrero of the Southern District of New York recently argued, “[t]he
expense [of litigation may be] disproportionate if it significantly exceeds the
value of the issue in dispute, as measured by some objective standard.” 370 It
would be irrational, the argument goes, to create a system where discovery
costs are higher than the amount in controversy. So if a plaintiff in an em-

365. See supra Part I.A.
366. Endo, supra note 4, at 1323 (citing Brooke D. Coleman, The Efficiency Norm, 56 B.C.
L. REV. 1777, 1797–800 (2015), and Charles Silver, Does Civil Justice Cost Too Much?, 80 TEX.
L. REV. 2073, 2073–74 (2002)). Granted, some have argued for more expansive understandings
of costs and benefits in litigation (and especially discovery). See Coleman, supra, at 1797–800;
ARTHUR R. MILLER, THE AUGUST 1983 AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE: PROMOTING EFFECTIVE CASE MANAGEMENT AND LAWYER RESPONSIBILITY 33
(1984) (“Everybody understands you can have a case where the values at stake transcend the
economics of the case, so this is not a pure dollar test.”).
367. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b) (requiring judges to consider “[(1)] the importance of the issues at stake in the action, [(2)] the amount in controversy, [(3)] the parties’ relative access to
relevant information, [(4)] the parties’ resources, [(5)] the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and [(6)] whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit”). See generally Gelbach & Kobayashi, supra note 295, at 1093 (using
law and economics to analyze each factor within the proportionality standard).
368. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b) advisory committee’s notes to 2015 amendment.
369. Michael Thomas Murphy, Occam’s Phaser: Making Proportional Discovery (Finally)
Work in Litigation by Requiring Phased Discovery, 4 STAN. J. COMPLEX LITIG. 89, 102 (2016)
(“[A] natural tendency exists to use the amount in controversy as the dominant factor to determine proportionality. We are, after all, examining cost.”); Memorandum from Judge David
G. Campbell to Judge Jeffrey Sutton Re: Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, at Rules Appendix B-6 (June 14, 2014) (on file with the Michigan Law Review) (reporting on a 2008 Federal Judicial Center survey finding that a quarter of attorneys in 3,550
cases believed discovery costs were “too high” relative to the amount in controversy); cf. Gelbach & Kobayashi, supra note 295, at 1111 (“In many cases—certainly, when money damages
are the sole requested relief—the amount in controversy (factor 2) will be the most objectively
determinable.”). But see id. at 1118 (arguing that Rule 26(b)(1)’s proportionality standard
“functionally provides judges with equitable discretion to consider normative issues”).
370. Victor Marrero, The Cost of Rules, The Rule of Costs, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 1599,
1627 (2016).
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ployment case is asking for backpay in the amount of $50,000, proportional
discovery would counsel that depositions and the costs of producing information should not equal an amount remotely equivalent to $50,000, let alone
exceed it. 371 As discussed above, some of the empirical literature on discovery focuses precisely on this discovery-costs-to-stakes ratio. But fairness,
equality, settlement, and regulation point in different ways when it comes to
costs. These four theories therefore have complex relationships with costs
that do not boil down to the discovery-costs-to-stakes ratio.
The fairness theory uniquely takes costs into account as an efficiency
tradeoff; we should maximize accuracy and participation up until discovery
costs outweigh them in a cost-benefits analysis. In a fairness paradigm, costs
are determined by the discovery-costs-to-stakes ratio. Fairness is a two-way
street that also includes the interests of the party responding to discovery requests. The concept of gamesmanship is almost purely used within the fairness theory. Indeed, most of the discovery-costs literature worries about
lawyers who strategically impose costs on opponents, thus making the entire
system unwieldy and burdensome.
The equality theory hinges on an existing asymmetry between plaintiffs
and defendants and between one-shotters and repeat players, so it is, by its
very nature, intended to impose unequal costs on the defendant–repeat player. In other words, costs are the point in an equality sense because the deeppocketed or knowledge-possessing party must bear the costs of equalizing
the litigation equipment of the other party. As with the fairness theory, however, costs should never exceed the stakes of the litigation.
Once we reach the view that discovery is meant to narrow issues for trial, the question of costs ceases to be about the stakes of the case or about absolute dollar numbers. The focus should instead be on a comparison of
discovery costs and—hypothetically—trial costs if discovery did not exist. In
other words, the question becomes entirely comparative. Discovery is substituting for what the Rules’ drafters assumed would be a more expensive trial
that involved cross-examinations and the production of documents in front
of a judge or jury. Ex ante, is there any reason to believe that modern discovery should be more costly than pre-1938 trials? Discovery does take much
longer because it is an out of court process. It is also handled almost entirely
by the parties, opening the doors to abuse, and it can be more expansive because it lacks the pressure of concentrating the entire case in a few days or
weeks. On the other hand, the costs can be more predictable, and parties can
thoroughly litigate the burdens in motion practice away from the factfinder.
Moreover, discovery does not demand the kind of total commitment and

371. Cf. Oxbow Carbon & Mins. LLC v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 322 F.R.D. 1, 8 (D.D.C.
2017) (“Given the very substantial amount of damages that Oxbow seeks to recover in this
case, its cost of complying with the discovery request to produce information relevant to Defendants’ defense of Oxbow’s claims does not strike the [court] as excessive.”).
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preparation that trials require from lawyers. 372 In the legal industry, trials are
known to be extraordinarily expensive. Another trial problem is the presentation of surprising theretofore-unseen evidence, as well as the necessity of
quickly deciding questions about relevance or admissibility. Moreover, discovery avoids the burden of impaneling a jury—a cost saving that goes beyond mere dollars and also must account for the imposition on the jurors.
The 1938 drafters weighed these competing values and decided that discovery was likely systemically superior to jury trials.
Regulatory discovery, for its part, also completely reconceptualizes the
problem of discovery costs as a comparative question. Discovery within a
private-enforcement paradigm is necessarily a government tool; its only
counterpart is the administrative subpoena. The relationship between a particular case’s amount in controversy and discovery is thus somewhat beside
the point. Contra Judge Hardiman’s suggestion that discovery is inappropriate for cases below $500,000, regulatory discovery can produce significant
positive spillovers in small cases. As discussed above, discovery in the sexual
harassment case Faragher v. City of Boca Raton—with an amount in controversy below $100,000—became the basis for widespread reforms to employment and personnel practices. The EEOC exercises its subpoena and
enforcement powers in dozens of small cases every year. 373 And, as discussed
above, the NLRB once imposed subpoena costs of potentially $1 million dollars on McDonalds even though the maximum penalty in the case was
$50,000. 374
That is why the question of whether discovery costs are too high in a
private-enforcement case depends mostly on whether the case generates more
costs than a comparable agency investigation. This isn’t to say that agency
costs are optimal, but only that an agency investigation is the realistic alternative to private enforcement and is therefore a good point of reference.
Costs, in this view, have very little to do with the individual interests of
plaintiffs or defendants. They are instead better considered within the context of the systemic benefit of enforcing a statute in which Congress chose
private plaintiffs in addition to, or instead of, agencies. 375
Framing the question in a comparative way shows that private-discovery
costs can often be similar to agency-subpoena costs. One area where critics
have pilloried broad discovery is securities litigation. As discussed above,
Congress oriented the PSLRA around the problem of discovery costs. In iso372. See Bronsteen, supra note 116, at 528. But see id. at 533 (suggesting that discovery
and pretrial costs exceed the costs of trial).
373. See EEOC Press Releases, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N,
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/ [https://perma.cc/6QCY-BB7Y].
374. See supra note 250 and accompanying text.
375. Of course, many have argued that neither discovery nor administrative subpoenas
are appropriate; both should be shunned. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, OVERDOSE: HOW
EXCESSIVE GOVERNMENT REGULATION STIFLES PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION 10–12 (2006);
PHILIP K. HOWARD, THE DEATH OF COMMON SENSE: HOW LAW IS SUFFOCATING AMERICA 11
(1994).
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lation, discovery requests in securities cases do seem to be extremely broad,
expensive, and intrusive. But compared to SEC subpoenas—which can be
litigation thermonuclear devices—private discovery appears positively tame.
There is unfortunately no systematic SEC data that would allow for an accurate comparison. According to public information, however, the SEC routinely issues hundreds of either informal “requests” for information or
subpoenas during investigations. Anecdotal examples show at least the range
of SEC investigations. For instance, large banks have recently reported that
broad SEC subpoenas forced them to produce anywhere from 750,000 documents in a case involving Wells Fargo to as much as eight million documents in a case involving Goldman Sachs. 376 Assembling these colossal
productions take thousands of hours and hundreds of compliance workers
and outside counsel review. Indeed, as Tesla and Kraft Heinz found recently,
a single SEC subpoena can send a company’s stock tumbling. 377 SEC investigations can also be notoriously protracted, with many continuing for more
than four years. 378 And these investigations are not outliers among agencies. 379 With this broader context in view, the threat of private discovery in
securities or antitrust cases seems much less intrusive. Judges should keep
these comparative costs in mind.
C. The Implications of Regulatory Discovery
Conceptualizing discovery as a regulatory tool should restructure the
way courts consider discovery questions. As mentioned above, regulatory
discovery is systemic, depends on deterrence not accuracy, and most closely
resembles administrative subpoenas. These differences make regulatory discovery powerful and rebut arguments presented by critics of the current discovery system. Specifically, we should focus on three consequences of
regulatory discovery:
1.

Private Enforcement as a Separate Category

Courts should analyze private-enforcement cases, and the breadth of
discovery therein, differently than other cases. Private enforcement is a fundamentally distinct process in the U.S. legal system. It represents the delega-

376. Andrew N. Vollmer, Need for Narrower Subpoenas in SEC Investigations, LAW.COM
(Oct. 9, 2014), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/almID/1202672781062/need-fornarrower-subpoenas-in-sec-investigations/ (on file with the Michigan Law Review).
377. Greg Farrell, Tesla Receives Subpoena over Musk’s Take-Private Tweet, BLOOMBERG
(Aug. 15, 2018, 11:20 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-08-15/tesladrops-on-report-of-sec-subpoena-over-musk-go-private-plan [https://perma.cc/5HEB-H56J];
Alistair Gray, SEC Opens Investigation into Kraft Heinz Accounting, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2019),
https://www.ft.com/content/bb32ac58-3628-11e9-bb0c-42459962a812 (on file with the Michigan Law Review).
378. Vollmer, supra note 376.
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tion of government enforcement power to private plaintiffs. As discussed at
length above, its closest analogue, and relevant point of departure, must be
the administrative subpoena. In that context, the relevant agency’s enabling
act must first authorize the relevant subpoena, and internal agency rules
must then specify the scope and procedures that agency officials must follow.
Administrative discovery is intimately tied with statutory authorization. This
does not mean that discovery should be broader than it is—rather, it means
only that our current broad discovery paradigm is justifiable in these cases.
Just as with administrative subpoenas, regulatory discovery must begin
with an understanding of the purposes of the statute that authorize private
enforcement. Courts cannot just blindly rely on Rule 26’s invocation that
discovery extends only to matters that are “relevant to any party’s claim or
defense and proportional to the needs of the case.” 380 Instead, they must engage in a simultaneous analysis of the underlying statute that grants plaintiffs
a private right of action and must ask whether there is a nexus between the
discovery at issue, Rule 26, and the broader purposes of the statute. Proportionality should not be dependent on the “needs of the case” but instead on
the needs of the relevant private-enforcement regime.
In regulatory cases, discovery should be informed by a spectrum of statutes that depend mostly on private enforcement, hybrid regimes that depend
on both public and private action, and statutes that only agencies can enforce. 381 In the first group, statutory regimes depend mostly on private enforcement even though there are bureaucracies, too. Enforcement of FLSA,
for example, falls mostly to employees and employment class actions, not to
the NLRB. So too Civil Rights Act Title VII claims, which are mostly private,
even though the DOJ Civil Rights Division has some enforcement power. In
these cases, broad discovery is fundamental. Without it, entire statutory regimes would go unenforced. As Judge Schiendlin once noted, “if a case has
the potential for broad public impact, then public policy weighs heavily in
favor of permitting extensive discovery.” 382 Courts should therefore read into
the statutes a broad right to discovery.
In the second group, hybrid regimes abound, including some of our
most important statutes. For example, agencies share enforcement authority
with private parties in contexts like antitrust (Sherman Act/FTC), environmental law (Clean Water Act/EPA), and securities (Securities and Exchange
Act/SEC). In those cases, broad discovery is important though not nearly as
necessary as in the first group.
Within this second group, courts should err on the side of broad discovery but limit it where it seems clear that an agency could replace private en-

380. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b).
381. Clopton, supra note 356, at 295–99; Engstrom, supra note 278, at 1923 (discussing
the False Claims Act’s qui tam regime as “a complex public-private hybrid”); Engstrom, supra
note 24, at 623 (discussing the evolution of “many of our most consequential regulatory regimes” into “hybrids of public and private enforcement [with] multiple enforcers”).
382. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 321 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
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forcement. At first blush, this might be a difficult administrative task for
courts. Questions of agency budgetary priorities and resources devoted to
enforcement seem outside of judicial purview. Moreover, there are political
reasons why agencies, and Congress, leave plenty of room for private enforcement. 383 But one accessible way for courts to answer this question is to
pay attention to agency or other public enforcers’ announcements, public
reports, and amicus briefs. The SEC, for instance, often writes or joins amicus briefs in important cases, outlining whether a potential procedural
change might weaken private and public enforcement and the broader effects of that change. 384 So too, the FTC 385 and EEOC 386 often file amicus
briefs, including in procedure cases.
Indeed, in Twombly, sixteen states wrote an amicus brief arguing that
heightened pleading standards would not weaken enforcement because state
attorneys general had the tools—including civil investigative demands—to
replace private enforcement. 387 Additionally, judges could take notice of
congressional action in certain areas. Below, I offer an example of this where
Congress empowered the CFPB to assume enforcement tasks after 2010 that
were originally performed by private parties.

383. See, e.g., FARHANG, supra note 13, at 64.
384. See Giovanni P. Prezioso, Gen. Couns., U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Speech by SEC
Staff: Remarks Before the American Bar Association Section of Business Law, General Counsel
Forum
(June
3,
2004),
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch060304gpp.htm
[https://perma.cc/NKF9-E6Q8] (“In light of the Commission’s longstanding commitment to
private enforcement of the securities laws, we do not limit our participation to cases that have a
direct impact on the Commission’s own litigation and regulatory programs.”). This practice
continues today. See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent,
Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 573 U.S. 258 (2014) (No. 13-317); see also Commission Amicus / Friend of the Court Briefs, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov
/litigation/amicusbriefs.shtml [https://perma.cc/5GSD-QYKF].
385. See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 1–
2, Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228 (2013) (No. 12-133) (arguing against a
broad interpretation of the Federal Arbitration Act that would “prevent private parties from
obtaining redress for violations of their federal statutory rights”); see also Amicus Briefs, FED.
TRADE COMM’N, https://ftc.gov/policy/advocacy/amicus-briefs [https://perma.cc/SQY3HRBC] (explaining that the FTC files amicus briefs “to provide information that can help the
court make its decision in a way that protects consumers or promotes competition”).
386. See, e.g., Brief of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as Amicus Curiae Supporting the Plaintiff-Appellant & Reversal at 1, Logan v. MGM Grand Detroit Casino,
939 F.3d 824 (6th Cir. 2019) (No. 18-1381) (“Private enforcement actions are [a] key avenue
for enforcing Title VII and the other federal anti-discrimination statutes.”); see also Commission Appellate and Amicus Briefs, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N,
https://www1.eeoc.gov/eeoc/litigation/briefs.cfm [https://perma.cc/87HC-UHTC] (showing
that the EEOC often file amicus briefs in the U.S. Court of Appeals, district courts, and state
courts).
387. See Brief of the Commonwealth of Virginia & 15 Other States as Amici Curiae in
Support of the Petitioners, Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (No. 05-1126). I
have previously written about this phenomenon of state briefs in federal procedure cases. Diego A. Zambrano, The States’ Interest in Federal Procedure, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1805 (2018).
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Finally, in the third group, where bureaucracies engage in the bulk of
enforcement, as in OSHA cases or EEOC actions, courts may comfortably
limit the scope of discovery if an agency has occupied the field or heavily
regulated the area. Again, the information relevant for this determination
exists in agency announcements, public reports, and amicus briefs.
FIGURE 3

Public
Enforcement
Less
Discovery

Hybrid
Public-Private
Scope of
Discovery

Private
Enforcement
More
Discovery

This spectrum, along with the regulatory-discovery theory, allows us to
reconsider the question of discovery costs. As explored above, high discovery
costs are rare and may exist in less than 5 percent of all cases. 388 Within this
smaller subset of cases, the Federal Judicial Center has noted that “that patent, trademark, securities, and antitrust cases stood out for their high discovery expenses.” 389 Two of these regimes—securities and antitrust—
explicitly depend on delegated private enforcement. In the antitrust context,
private enforcement accounts for 90 percent of all antitrust filings. 390 In the
securities realm, the SEC routinely declares that private enforcement is “essential” and empirical studies find that “private enforcement seems to dwarf
public enforcement.” 391 These contexts are somewhere between the hybrid
public-private or private-enforcement groups. Therefore, courts should err
on the side on broader discovery because it serves regulatory goals.
But there are areas where courts and system designers should restrict
discovery or at least increasingly supervise it. Prior to the Dodd-Frank Act,
federal consumer–financial protection law was weakly enforced by either the
FTC (under the FTCA) or private claims under the Fair Debt Collections
Practices Act and similar statutes. 392 The FTCA provided no private right of
action. Given the weakness of the FTC, broad discovery was justified for

388. See CONNOLLY ET AL., supra note 56, at 621.
389. WILLGING ET AL., supra note 55, at 244.
390. See supra note 141.
391. S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 8 (1995); John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class
Action: An Essay on Deterrence and Its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1543 (2006);
see also Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities
Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 511–13 (1991).
392. Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, Pub. L. No. 63-203, § 5, 38 Stat. 717, 719
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58); Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Pub. L. 95109, § 813, 91 Stat 874, 881 (1977) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692–1692p).
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FDCPA and state law claims. Dodd-Frank, however, completely changed
this. By creating the CFPB, and providing that agency with the power to issue broad civil investigative demands, the statute reordered the entire area
award from the hybrid bucket toward public enforcement. The CFPB was
given broad investigatory powers to obtain documents, tangible items, and
depositions—prior to any formal investigation—and independent funding to
support its mandate. 393 This powerful agency, in a sense, occupied the field
and displaced the relevance of private claims (both state and federal). Given
a regulatory-discovery framework, it would be sensible for courts to limit
discovery in this context, especially because the FTCA and Dodd-Frank still
do not authorize private rights of action. 394
2.

Judicial Administrability

The proposals in this Section can lean on existing analytical frameworks
that are judicially administrable. To summarize:
•

In private-enforcement cases, courts should err on the side of
broad discovery by interpreting “proportionality” in relation not
only to the needs of the specific case but also to the needs of the
relevant statutory regime and industry.

•

The breadth of discovery should be related to whether the statutory regime depends (1) largely, (2) somewhat, or (3) scarcely, on
private enforcement. The more a regime depends on private enforcement, the broader discovery should be, and vice versa.

•

To the extent that Congress or agencies indicate that public enforcement can replace private enforcement, courts should err on
the side of narrow discovery.

•

In calculating the question of discovery costs, parties and courts
should compare the costs of private discovery to the costs of compliance with an analogous administrative subpoena.

At first blush, this framework is complex and perhaps unwieldy—it asks
courts to determine whether discovery has regulatory consequences, how it
interacts with the statutory claim, and the potential benefit of having the relevant information in the public eye. This may seem like an inappropriate
analysis at the discovery stage. Moreover, if courts grant public, hybrid, and
private actions different levels of discovery, this might yield a nightmare of
mixed and matched procedures. Complex cases potentially feature two or
even three of the claim types. This casts doubt on the feasibility of the proposal.

393. Lynyak & Tierney, supra note 248, at 773-76.
394. Burbank et al., supra note 51, at 704; see Michael M. Krauss, Julie R. Landy & Jeremy
R. Harrell, For Whom the Whistle Blows: The Role of Private Enforcement in Dodd-Frank’s Regulatory Framework, 8 U. ST. THOMAS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 194 (2014).
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But the key conceptual move that underlies the entire proposal is that
courts should consider the regulatory public benefits of discovery. Fortunately, courts already conduct analogous analyses in several discovery contexts, weakening potential concerns with judicial administrability. To begin,
when courts consider protective orders under Rule 26(c), they balance several factors, often including both “whether confidentiality is being sought over
information important to public health and safety” and “whether the case
involves issues important to the public.” 395 Because of this analysis, courts
have developed an arsenal of methods to analyze how discovery interacts
with the public interest. For example, in the face of motions for protective
orders, courts have recently allowed the public release of material covering
Bill Cosby’s history of sexual assault 396 and police video documenting the use
of excessive force. 397 In both cases, courts had to grapple with the public interest in the information produced, focusing on the statutory provisions at
issue, media interest, and public-facing nature of the cases.
Similarly, in considering discovery fee-shifting motions—requests by respondents to shift the costs of production on to the requesting party—courts
ask whether the litigation is “of public importance.” 398 This analysis explicitly blurs the line between public and private enforcement. For example,
courts in this context have found that cases dealing with the Exxon Valdez
oil spill and the Lockerbie bombing did not warrant shifting of discovery
costs because of the “nature of the cases and the strong public interest in the
outcome.” 399
In yet a third analogous context, courts conduct a similar analysis of the
public interest when they consider motions or stipulations to hold documents produced to the court under seal. 400 Finally, and perhaps most relevantly, as discussed above, courts implicitly consider the impact of
administrative subpoenas on regulated industries. 401
The regulatory-discovery framework is only an extension of these four
existing approaches. References to public welfare already incorporate some
of the regulatory goals of private discovery. If anything, discovery as regulation would narrow the question to considerations of deterrence, the effects
on the regulated industry, and the spillover effects on the law and relevant
government agencies. Courts can quite comfortably engage in this analysis of
social or regulatory benefits during discovery disputes. It is possible for

395. Glenmede Tr. Co. v. Thompson, 56 F.3d 476, 483 (3d Cir. 1995).
396. Constand v. Cosby, 229 F.R.D. 472, 480 (E.D. Pa. 2005).
397. Harmon v. City of Santa Clara, 323 F.R.D. 617 (N.D. Cal. 2018).
398. DeGeer v. Gillis, 755 F. Supp. 2d 909, 928 (N.D. Ill. 2010).
399. In re Law Firms of McCourts & McGrigor Donald, No. M. 19-96 (JSM), 2001 WL
345233, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 9, 2001); In re Exxon Valdez, 142 F.R.D. 380, 383–84 (D.D.C.
1992).
400. Citizens First Nat’l Bank of Princeton v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 178 F.3d 943 (7th Cir.
1999).
401. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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courts to consider and weigh the spillover regulatory effects of discovery and
litigation while at the same time acknowledging that “[t]he collateral effects
of litigation should not be allowed to supplant th[e] primary purpose.” 402
They already do. Again, it bears emphasis that this regulatory framework only applies in a minority of cases that implicate private-enforcement regimes.
There is little, if any, reason to believe that such an application would be unrealistic or unduly burdensome.
3.

Regulation and Transsubstantivity

The existence of a category of cases that might benefit from broader regulatory discovery is not necessarily incompatible with our idea of transsubstantivity. 403 The traditional understanding of the transsubstantive principle
is that the rules of procedure should apply equally regardless of the substantive claim. 404 The transsubstantive ideal draws directly from the Rules Enabling Act of 1934 and its prohibition of rules that “enlarge” or “abridge”
substantive rights. 405 One of the principle’s core purposes is simplicity. 406
Judges should be able to adjudicate substantive claims without dealing with
different procedures in every case. David Marcus has argued that transsubstantivity could also be defended as a principle of institutional allocation of
power between courts and Congress. 407 The judiciary could “legitimately
generate trans-substantive rules, that is, rules not designed to achieve any
particular goals of substantive policy.” 408 Substance-specific rules, by contrast, necessitate a political entity with democratic legitimacy, like Congress.
Transsubstantivity, therefore, operates at its zenith when it polices these institutional boundaries.
That courts should recognize discovery’s regulatory purpose is consonant with the transsubstantive ideals of simplicity and institutional allocation. As to simplicity, discovery is the bread and butter of litigation.
Magistrate judges, and many district court judges, are consummate discovery experts. 409 Applying the principles discussed above on judicial administrability, judges should be able to easily recognize regulatory discovery.

402. Richard L. Marcus, The Discovery Confidentiality Controversy, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV.
457, 470.
403. See Stephen N. Subrin, Fudge Points and Thin Ice in Discovery Reform and the Case
for Selective Substance-Specific Procedure, 46 FLA. L. REV. 27, 45–46 (1994).
404. David Marcus, The Past, Present, and Future of Trans-substantivity in Federal Civil
Procedure, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 371, 372–73 (2010).
405. 28 U.S.C. § 2072.
406. See id.
407. Marcus, supra note 404, at 416.
408. Id.
409. Diego A. Zambrano, Judicial Mistakes in Discovery, 113 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 197,
219–20 (2018) (making this point and observing that, in 2015, magistrate judges “dealt with
over 100,000 nondispositive motions, 55,600 pretrial conferences, and over 10,000 motion
hearings”).
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Moreover, as to institutional allocation, regulatory discovery draws legitimacy precisely from congressional authorization of private enforcement. It
therefore does not imply that the judiciary should overstep its institutional
role into the political realm. Nor does it require substance-specific rules because it does not demand that federal judges treat specific substantive categories of cases differently (securities or otherwise). It only asks judges to
recognize the distinctiveness of a congressionally authorized transsubstantive category of cases—those reliant on private enforcement.
Even in cases where judges should draw on different underlying theories
of discovery depending on the substantive claim, the transsubstantive ideal
survives because it is compatible with judicial discretion. A tailored approach to discovery only allows judges to exercise their considerable and
well-recognized power to adapt procedures to the needs of each specific
case. 410 The discovery provisions of the FRCP are mostly phrased, and operate, like standards, not definitive rules. Indeed, the “Federal Rule drafters
made a conscious choice to grant broad discretion, based on the assumption
that trial judges had the experience and expertise to appropriately tailor procedures to the circumstances of individual cases.” 411 That is why scholars
have recognized for decades that district and magistrate judges adapt the discovery rules to specific cases, altering the number of interrogatories, extent
and depth of document discovery, depositions, and even attorneys’ fees. 412
Recognition that regulatory discovery requires tailored treatment would
draw on an appropriate exercise of this existing judicial discretion. 413 So, allowing judges to expand the number of interrogatories in an antitrust class
action, rather than a typical breach of contract case, is well within existing
power and does not conflict with transsubstantivity.
To the extent that regulatory discovery may sometimes conflict with
transsubstantivity, scholars have variously argued that such conflicts are as
inevitable as they are appropriate. Robert Bone, for instance, has forcefully
argued that “different cases with different substantive interests might call for
different procedural rules if the substantive interests at stake have different
value or if the cost of the procedure varies with different case types.” 414 Bone
specifically noted in the context of transsubstantivity and the fairness theory
of discovery: “[C]onsider the scope of pre-trial discovery. . . . [O]btaining
more information is not valuable in itself; it is valuable because information
revelation improves the adversarial process and increases the likelihood of

410. See Pamela K. Bookman & David L. Noll, Ad Hoc Procedure, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 767,
785–87 (2017).
411. Robert G. Bone, Securing the Normative Foundations of Litigation Reform, 86 B.U. L.
REV. 1155, 1169 (2006).
412. Id. at 1160; Bookman & Noll, supra note 410, at 785.
413. Subrin argues that we should allow a more flexible form of transsubstantivity in the
discovery context. Subrin, supra note 403, at 45–46.
414. Bone, supra note 411, at 1169; see e.g., Robert G. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules,
and the Regulation of Court Access, 94 IOWA L. REV. 873, 936 (2009).
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an accurate result.” 415 In the context of regulatory discovery, more information is valuable in the realm of private enforcement and would redound
to the benefit of many regulatory areas—including civil rights and employment law—where transsubstantivity may otherwise generate a negative impact. 416 All of this affirms, yet again, the legitimacy of regulatory discovery.
4.

The Propriety of Producer Pays

In a regulatory-discovery paradigm, a producer-pays rule is quite sensible. As an initial matter, businesses that enter a heavily regulated industry
are on notice about potential costs stemming from routine government enforcement. They therefore expect and price in the cost of administrative
subpoenas as a regular cost of business and can pass the cost on to consumers. Moreover, in a regulated market, someone must bear the costs of regulation. If administrative subpoenas operated under a requestor-pays rule, then
the government would be deterred from fully pursuing administrative enforcement or would pass on the costs to all taxpayers. It is much fairer for
the regulated entities themselves, and their consumers, to internalize the
costs of their operations, rather than externalize them on to taxpayers. After
all, regulated entities reap benefits from the predictability and rule-of-law
values that agencies bring to regulated industries. Agencies ensure that competitors are not violating the law through antitrust conspiracies or unfair
business competition. Paying for discovery costs is part and parcel of paying
for the benefits of this regulation. And these payments are also substitutes
for engaging in private enforcement against competitors. Finally, entities can
always challenge overbroad or unduly burdensome administrative subpoenas.
5.

Transparency and Protective Orders

All of these benefits come with a caveat: regulated entities have grown
adept at preparing confidentiality provisions or obtaining protective orders
that blunt discovery’s public impact. Under Rule 26(c) “any person from
whom discovery is sought may move for a protective order.” 417 A court has
discretion, on a showing of good cause, to issue a protective order “to protect
a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue
burden or expense.” 418 Protective orders are usually individualized and discrete, with each document evaluated separately. 419 In complex litigation,
415. Bone, supra note 411, at 1162.
416. Suzette Malveaux, A Diamond in the Rough: Trans-substantivity of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and Its Detrimental Impact on Civil Rights, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 455, 458–59
(2014) (arguing that transsubstantivity is flawed because it has a disparate impact on employment and civil rights litigation).
417. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1).
418. Id.
419. Childs, supra note 333, at 565–66.
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however, they are “a different beast.” 420 Under “umbrella” protective orders,
parties agree to a blanket order at the outset of discovery. 421 Typically, an
umbrella order “permits a party to designate parts of its produced discovery
as confidential upon a good faith belief that there is good cause for the designated discovery to be included in the protective order.” 422 Many parties also negotiate procedures for the deletion of produced documents at the close
of the matter. 423
Protective orders obviously present a threat to the regulatory benefits of
private discovery. Scholars have suggested that these orders have recently
become much more common or expansive. 424 But even if this is true, the extent of its effect is unclear. On the one hand, limiting third-party access to
discovery would blunt the positive spillovers of regulatory discovery, including the possibility of general deterrence. Disney’s competitors, the sovereigndebt market, and cities observing the Faragher case, would not have been
able to restructure their behavior in response to those cases. On the other
hand, protective orders retain the internal benefits of regulatory discovery,
including specific deterrence, and perhaps expand them. The more a target
company is assured that its internal information will not be public, the more
willing it may be to engage in a thorough internal investigation. So protective orders may present a clear danger to the external benefits of discovery—
general deterrence—but may enhance the “introspective” regulatory benefits
of discovery—specific deterrence.
Given protective orders’ potential impact on industries and primary behavior, courts addressing motions for protective orders should consider not
only the public interest in having access to certain information—which is
currently part of the test—but, more importantly, all of the regulatory benefits discussed above: deterrence, corporate reform, and routinization of corporate information gathering. Lower courts dealing with protective orders
focus mostly on Rule 26(c)’s “good cause” requirement. This is a flexible
standard that allows courts to take into account up to eight factors (including the effects of potential disclosure, and the private and public interests at
stake). Courts could comfortably fit into this analysis discovery’s positive
spillover effects. Discovery as regulation demands a more exacting test for
blanket protective orders because they present a significant impediment to
regulatory goals.

420. Id. at 566.
421. See 8A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 217, § 2035 (Procedure for Obtaining Protective
Orders); see also Childs, supra note 333, at 566.
422. REAGAN, supra note 329, at 5.
423. Robert D. Keeling & Ray Mangum, The Burden of Privacy in Discovery, 20 SEDONA
CONF. J. 415, 438 n.76 (2019).
424. Endo, supra note 107.
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D. The German (Dis)advantage in Civil Procedure?
As a final more speculative note, perhaps private enforcement partly explains why broad and adversarial regulatory discovery may be necessary in
the United States but not in any other country. John Langbein claims in a
seminal article that German procedure has an “advantage” over American
procedure because of its judicially imposed discovery constraints. 425 Langbein argues that German judges’ close supervision of fact gathering maintained a relatively narrow and focused legal process—a boon for both parties
and the system. To be sure, Langbein qualified “that the main concern of this
article is not the sprawling Big Case, but the traditional bipolar lawsuit in
contract, tort, or entitlement.” 426 That qualification likely removes the possibility that Langbein meant to cover regulatory discovery. But the Article has
influenced similar, and sometimes broader, critiques of American discovery,
with Steve Subrin going as far as asking if Americans were “nuts” for embracing broad discovery. 427
A regulatory view of discovery, however, highlights why it is complicated, and perhaps impossible, to compare the American and German discovery processes. European countries, Japan, and Australia, along with most
other countries, rely overwhelmingly on ex ante regulation or administrative
enforcement to apply the law. The costs of their regulatory systems are explicit in the costs of market entry—administrative review, drawn out licensing requirements, etc.—and in the costs of a much larger bureaucracy. 428
That allows the ex post litigation system to be either non-existent or relatively lean. But in an American-style system, where ex ante regulation is lean
and private enforcement is paramount, discovery may bear the costs of regulation. This means that the relevant comparison should not be between the
costs of American and German discovery but rather whether the entire
American package—including ex ante and ex post regulation and the discovery system—imposes more costs than the entire German regulatory package,
both ex ante and ex post. Such a comparison makes the question much more
complicated and perhaps unanswerable.
I do not mean to settle this question here but merely to speculate that
conceptualizing discovery as regulation may push us to rethink this comparison. To be sure, proponents of the German approach might argue that an ex
ante regulatory system is superior to an ex post system with broad discovery.
This question has been the subject of decades-long scholarly debates and it
remains unclear whether the first-best system is a civil law approach with
425. John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV.
823, 824 (1985).
426. Id. at 825.
427. Although, again, it’s possible that Subrin was excluding complex litigation cases. See
Subrin, supra note 2, at 299–300.
428. Cf. KAGAN, supra note 10, at 7–11; Samuel Issacharoff, Regulating After the Fact, 56
DEPAUL L. REV. 375, 377 (2007) (advocating ex post regulation for its ability to lower impediments to market entry).
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narrow discovery or the American approach. But taking private enforcement
as a given—a choice that Congress made long ago—broad discovery seems
necessary. Determining which system is more efficient would take a comprehensive study, but a priori there may not be any civil law advantage in
civil procedure if the ex ante system is much more burdensome. For example, the recent European data law (GDPR) aimed at large tech firms imposed
high ex ante compliance costs of billions of dollars. 429 In the United States
there is no similar regulation, but plaintiffs have increasingly sued Google
and other tech companies for violating privacy-related statutes. 430 Moreover,
U.S. discovery likely contributes to a lower trial rate and higher settlement
rate, of between around 50 percent and 80 percent of cases, than in European
countries like France, where only 8–13 percent of cases are resolved in settlement. 431 While “[t]here are several possible explanations for this variance . . . the existence of robust (and expensive) discovery in the United
States must rank high” among the possible explanations for fewer trials
here. 432
CONCLUSION
This Article attempted to move discovery debates forward by reframing
the foundations of private-enforcement discovery through a regulatory theory. A focus on regulatory discovery reconceptualizes the underlying purposes
of discovery and complements its traditional foundations in fairness, equality, and settlement. Private discovery resembles, and in many ways, is nothing
more than administrative subpoena power delegated to private-enforcement
agents. This power is fundamental in a country that depends on private litigants to enforce some of our most important statutes. Critics of the system
must wrestle with this analogy. If this theory is accurate, courts must also
embrace a comparative approach to discovery costs.
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